

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT TACOMA**

**IN RE CYTODYN STOCKHOLDER
DERIVATIVE LITIGATION**

Master File No.: 3:21-cv-05422-BHS

**CONSOLIDATED VERIFIED
STOCKHOLDER DERIVATIVE
COMPLAINT**

1 Plaintiffs David Berndt, Christopher Lavin, and Billie Ray Hensley by and through their
2 undersigned counsel, derivatively on behalf of Nominal Defendant CytoDyn, Inc. (“CytoDyn” or
3 the “Company”), submit this Consolidated Verified Shareholder Derivative Complaint (the
4 “Complaint”). Plaintiffs’ allegations are based upon their personal knowledge as to themselves
5 and their own acts, and upon information and belief, developed from the investigation and
6 analysis by Plaintiffs’ counsel, including a review of publicly available information, including
7 filings by CytoDyn with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), press releases,
8 news reports, analyst reports, investor conference transcripts, publicly available filings in
9 lawsuits, and matters of public record.

10 **I. NATURE OF THE ACTION**

11 1. This is a shareholder derivative action brought on behalf of and for the benefit of
12 the Company, against certain of its officers and/or directors named as defendants herein seeking
13 to remedy Defendants’ (defined below) breaches of fiduciary duties, contribution for violations
14 of Section 10(b) and 21(D) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”), and
15 other wrongful conduct as alleged herein and that occurred from March 27, 2020 through the
16 present (the “Relevant Period”). Defendants’ actions have caused, and will continue to cause,
17 substantial financial harm and other damages to the Company, including damages to its
18 reputation and goodwill.

19 2. The Company, a late-stage biotechnology company, is focused on the
20 development and commercialization of a *single* drug, leronlimab (a/k/a PRO 140 or Vyrologix).
21 Throughout the Relevant Period, Defendants touted leronlimab as a potential treatment for
22 patients suffering from various medical conditions, including HIV, COVID-19, and certain
23 cancers.

24 3. During the Relevant Period, Defendants claimed that CytoDyn had filed a
25 “complete” application seeking regulatory approval for leronlimab as a combinatory treatment
26 for HIV. However, non-public information shows that they knowingly submitted an application
27 that did not include several datasets that the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) had
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1 already indicated was required—an email from CytoDyn’s CEO to management stated that the
2 application should be filed “even if we are short in no matter what portion of whatever it is that
3 we are short” because the Company’s stock price has declined substantially due to repeated
4 delays with the submission. After just a “preliminary review,” the FDA issued a “Refusal to
5 File” Letter because CytoDyn’s applications suffered “numerous omissions and inadequacies so
6 severe as to render the application incomplete.”

7 4. Rather than curing these deficiencies, Defendants pivoted to pushing leronlimab
8 as a treatment for COVID-19. Over the course of two years, they caused CytoDyn to issue nearly
9 200 press releases that repeatedly touted leronlimab as a potential treatment for leronlimab. In
10 the midst of news of purportedly positive clinical results, certain of Defendants sold nearly \$31
11 million worth of their CytoDyn holdings, while in possession of material information that, in
12 fact, leronlimab had not been shown to be effective in treating COVID-19.

13 5. Then, in March 2021, CytoDyn acknowledged that clinical studies testing
14 leronlimab as a treatment of COVID-19 did not meet its primary endpoint. This, however, was
15 buried within releases masked by positive titles.

16 6. Defendants’ conduct was so egregious that the FDA took the rare step of issuing a
17 public statement on an unapproved drug. On May 17, 2021, the FDA stated that, based on
18 clinical results collected thus far, “it has become clear that the data currently available do not
19 support the clinical benefit of leronlimab for the treatment of COVID-19.”

20 7. The foregoing revelations precipitated the filing of a securities class action in this
21 District against CytoDyn and certain of the defendants named herein, captioned *Courter, et al. v.*
22 *CytoDyn Inc., et al.*, Case No. 3:21-cv-05190-BHS (the “Securities Class Action”).

23 8. At least half of the Company’s current Board could not disinterestedly and
24 independently respond to a litigation demand in connection with the misleading representations
25 as alleged herein.
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II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

9. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because Plaintiff's claims raise a federal question under Sections 10(b) and 21(D) of the Exchange Act.

10. This Court has supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining claims under 28 U.S.C. §1367.

11. This Court has jurisdiction over each defendant named herein because each defendant is either a corporation that conducts business in and maintains operations in this District or is an individual who has sufficient minimum contacts with this District to render the exercise of jurisdiction by the District courts permissible under traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.

12. Venue is proper in this Court in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1391 because: (i) CytoDyn maintains its principal place of business in this District; (ii) one or more of the defendants either resides in or maintains executive offices in this District; (iii) a substantial portion of the transactions and wrongs complained of herein, including Defendants' primary participation in the wrongful acts detailed herein, in violation of fiduciary duties owed to CytoDyn, occurred in this District; and (iv) Defendants have received substantial compensation in this District by doing business here and engaging in numerous activities that had an effect in this District.

III. PARTIES

Plaintiffs

13. *Plaintiff David Berndt* ("Plaintiff Berndt") is a current owner of the Company's stock, purchasing his Company stock on June 24, 2020. Plaintiff Berndt has held the stock during the time of the continuous wrongful course of conduct alleged herein and continues to hold his CytoDyn stock. Plaintiff Berndt will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the stockholders in enforcing the rights of the Company.

14. *Plaintiff Christopher Lavin* ("Plaintiff Lavin") is a current owner of the Company's stock, purchasing his Company stock on August 20, 2020. Plaintiff Lavin has held

the stock during the time of the continuous wrongful course of conduct alleged herein and continues to hold his CytoDyn stock. Plaintiff Lavin will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the stockholders in enforcing the rights of the Company.

15. ***Plaintiff Billie Ray Hensley*** (“Plaintiff Hensley”) is a current owner of the Company’s stock, purchasing his Company stock on September 12, 2008. Plaintiff Hensley has held the stock during the time of the continuous wrongful course of conduct alleged herein and continues to hold his CytoDyn stock. Plaintiff Hensley will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the stockholders in enforcing the rights of the Company.

Nominal Defendant

16. ***Nominal Defendant CytoDyn*** is a biotechnology company. Headquartered in Vancouver, Washington, and incorporated in Delaware, the Company is focused on the development and commercialization of a drug, leronlimab, which has long been promoted as a potential therapy for HIV patients.

Director Defendants

17. ***Defendant Scott A. Kelly, M.D.*** (“Kelly”) was named Chairman of the Board in December 2018 and has served as a director since April 2017. Defendant Kelly was named to the non-executive position of Chief Science Officer of the Company in July 2019. He was also appointed Chief Medical Officer and Head of Business Development in April 2020.

18. ***Defendant Nader Z. Pourhassan, Ph.D.*** (“Pourhassan”) joined the Company in 2008 as Chief Operating Officer and by September 2012, was appointed President and CEO. Defendant Pourhassan is also a director. He is named as a defendant in the Securities Class Action.

19. ***Defendant Jordan G. Naydenov*** (“Naydenov”) has been a director of the Company since June 2009. He is a member of the Audit Committee.

20. ***Defendant Alan P. Timmins*** (“Timmins”) served as a director of the Company from January 2020 to November 2021. He was Chair of the Audit Committee.

21. *Defendant Samir R. Patel, M.D.* (“Patel”) served as a director of the Company from April 2020 to November 2021.

22. Defendants Kelley, Pourhassan, Naydenov, Timmins and Patel are collectively referred to as the “Director Defendants.”

Officer Defendant

23. *Defendant Michael Mulholland* (“Mulholland”) is the Company’s Chief Financial Officer (“CFO”). He is named as a defendant in the Securities Class Action.

24. The Director Defendants and Defendant Mulholland are herein referred to as “Defendants.”

IV. SUBSTANTIVE ALLEGATIONS

A. Relevant Regulatory Framework

25. The Company, a late-stage biotechnology company, is focused on the development and commercialization of a *single* drug, leronlimab (a/k/a PRO 140 or Vyrologix). Throughout the Relevant Period, Defendants touted leronlimab as a potential treatment for patients suffering from various medical conditions, including HIV, COVID-19, and certain cancers.

26. According to the Company, leronlimab is “a monoclonal antibody C—C chemokine receptor type 5 (‘CCR5’) receptor antagonist. The target of leronlimab is the immunologic receptor CCR5...a protein located on the surface of various cells including white blood cells and cancer cells. On white blood cells, it serves as a receptor for chemical attractants called chemokines.”

27. Chemokines are a family of chemoattractant cytokines (small proteins secreted by cells that influence the immune system) which play a vital role in cell migration through venules from blood into tissue and vice versa, and in the induction of cell movement in response to a chemical (chemokine) gradient by a process known as chemotaxis. “The CCR5 receptor has been identified as a target in HIV, GvHD (graft-versus-host disease), NASH [(nonalcoholic steatohepatitis)], cancer metastasis, transplantation medicine, multiple sclerosis, traumatic brain

1 injury, stroke recovery, and a variety of inflammatory conditions, including potentially COVID-
2 19.”

3 28. Leronlimab is a type of drug known as a “biologic,” meaning it is derived from
4 living material as opposed to synthesized in a lab. According to the FDA:

5 [b]iological products, like other drugs, are used for the treatment, prevention or
6 cure of disease in humans. In contrast to chemically synthesized small molecular
7 weight drugs, which have a well-defined structure and can be thoroughly
8 characterized, biological products are generally derived from living material—
9 human, animal, or microorganism—are complex in structure, and thus are usually
10 not fully characterized.

11 29. And “Section 351 of the *Public Health Service (PHS) Act* defines a biological
12 product as a ‘virus, therapeutic serum, toxin, antitoxin, vaccine, blood, blood component or
13 derivative, allergenic product, or analogous product, . . . applicable to the prevention, treatment,
14 or cure of a disease or condition of human beings.’” (Alteration in original).

15 **1. BLA and Investigational New Drug Application**

16 30. The FDA typically requires an Investigational New Drug (“IND”) Application for
17 any clinical investigation involving administration of a drug to humans. Following initial
18 laboratory and animal testing that show that investigational use in humans is reasonably safe,
19 biological products like leronlimab can be studied in clinical trials in humans under an IND
20 application. Upon receipt of an IND application, the FDA will notify the applicant of the date it
21 received the application, and, within a set period of time, whether the IND applicant can begin
22 the proposed clinical research stage.

23 31. According to the FDA, there are three phases that apply to the pre-marketing
24 clinical research stage. During Phase 1, researchers test an experimental drug or treatment in a
25 small group of people for the first time and the researchers evaluate the drug’s safety and
26 determine a safe dosage range. The FDA recommends 20 to 100 healthy volunteers or people
27 with the disease/condition for study participants and a study length of several months.

28 32. During Phase 2, the experimental drug or treatment is given to a larger group of
people to see if it is effective and to evaluate its side effects. The FDA recommends several

1 hundred people with the disease/condition for study participants and a study length of several
2 months to two years.

3 33. During Phase 3, researchers give the experimental drug or treatment to large
4 groups of people. Researchers confirm its effectiveness, monitor side effects, compare it to
5 commonly used treatments, and collect information that will allow the experimental drug or
6 treatment to be used safely. The FDA recommends 300 to 3,000 volunteers who have the
7 relevant disease/condition for study participants and a study length of one to four years.

8 34. If the data generated by at least two Phase 1-3 trials demonstrate that the product
9 is safe and effective for its intended use, the data are submitted to the FDA as part of a marketing
10 application. Whereas a New Drug Application (“NDA”) is used for drugs subject to the drug
11 approval provisions of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“FD&C Act”), a Biologics
12 License Application (“BLA”) is required for biological products subject to licensure under the
13 Public Health Services Act, such as leronlimab. FDA approval to market a biologic is granted by
14 issuance of a biologics license. The ultimate issuance of a biologics license is a determination
15 that the product, the manufacturing process, and the manufacturing facilities meet applicable
16 requirements to ensure the continued safety, purity and potency of the product.

17 35. In accordance with these and related regulations, it was necessary for CytoDyn to
18 submit a BLA to the FDA to obtain a biologics license in order to market and sell leronlimab in
19 the United States. FDA Form 356h specifies the requirements for a BLA: (1) applicant
20 information; (2) product/manufacturing information; (3) pre-clinical studies; (4) clinical studies;
21 and (5) labeling. The FDA specifies in detail the information that an applicant must submit in a
22 BLA. A BLA applicant’s Responsible Official must also acknowledge that “[t]he data and
23 information in this submission have been reviewed and, to the best of my knowledge, are
24 certified to be true and accurate.”

25 36. Prior to submitting a BLA, an applicant is encouraged to discuss the planned
26 content of the application with the appropriate review division of the FDA at a pre-BLA meeting.
27 According to the FDA, “the pre-[]BLA meeting should be held sufficiently in advance of the
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1 planned submission of the application to allow for meaningful response to FDA feedback . . .”
2 and “[t]he FDA and the applicant will agree on the content of a complete application for the
3 proposed indication(s) at the pre-submission meeting.” According to the FDA, “[m]ajor
4 *components of the application (e.g., the complete study report of a Phase 3 clinical trial or the*
5 *full study report of required long-term safety data) are expected to be submitted with the*
6 *original application and are not subject to agreement for late submission.*”¹

7 37. Moreover, the FDA makes clear that “[a]pplications are expected to be complete,
8 as agreed between the FDA review team and the applicant at the pre-NDA/BLA meeting, at the
9 time of original submission of the application” and incomplete applications “will be subject to a
10 *Refuse-to-File decision.*”

11 38. At any time when submitting a BLA, a drug company can seek “Fast Track”
12 designation. According to the FDA, “Fast track is a process designed to facilitate the
13 development and expedite the review of drugs to treat serious conditions and fill an unmet
14 medical need.” Such a designation “must be requested by the drug company . . . any time during
15 the drug development process. [The] FDA will review the request and make a decision within
16 sixty days based on whether the drug fills an unmet medical need in a serious condition.”

17 39. If it receives a Fast Track designation for a proposed drug, an applicant is eligible
18 for some or all of: (1) more frequent meetings with the FDA to discuss the drug’s development
19 plan and ensure collection of appropriate data needed to support drug approval; (2) more
20 frequent written communication from the FDA about such things as the design of the proposed
21 clinical trials and use of biomarkers; (3) eligibility for “Accelerated Approval and Priority
22 Review,” if certain criteria are met; and (4) “Rolling Review,” which means that the applicant
23 can submit sections of its BLA for review by the FDA, rather than waiting until every section of
24 the BLA is completed before the entire application can be reviewed. The specific parameters of a
25 Rolling Review must be determined with the FDA.

26
27 ¹ Unless otherwise stated, all emphasis in bold and italics hereinafter is added.

40. Typically, the FDA only accepts the submission of one complete section of a BLA, e.g., the entire clinical section; however, the FDA may, on occasion, “in its discretion accept less than a complete section. . .” If an applicant submits its BLA in sections, each section “should be submitted for review in a form adequate to have been included in a complete BLA . . . submission.” Notably, “[d]rafts should not be included in a submission; if final reports need to be updated, the applicant should submit a formal amendment to the BLA . . . with the revised information.” According to the FDA, “[a]t the pre-BLA . . . meeting, the [FDA] and the [applicant] should work together to clearly define the parameters of accepting an incomplete section and to determine whether FDA could conduct a meaningful review of the submission before receiving the missing information.”

41. After the BLA is submitted, the FDA conducts a review, generally within sixty days, to determine whether the BLA submission is complete. The result of the FDA’s review is either a filing letter or, in rare instances, a Refuse to File (“RTF”) notification. If the BLA submission is acceptable for review, the Prescription Drug User Fee Act (“PDUFA”) indicates that the FDA intends to review 90% of standard BLA submissions within ten months of the sixty-day filing date and 90% of priority BLA submissions within six months of the sixty-day filing date. The date at the end of the review period is generally referred to as the PDUFA date.

42. In sum, in order to obtain a biologics license for leronlimab, CytoDyn needed to adhere to the foregoing process and timely submit a BLA containing the necessary information to the FDA.

2. The FDA’s Use of Emergency Use Authorizations (EUA) in Lieu of The BLA Process

43. In extraordinary circumstances, biotechnology or drug companies can seek to distribute a drug under a rarely used process called Emergency Use Authorization (“EUA”). Under Section 564 of the FD&C Act, when the Secretary of the United States Department of Health & Human Services (“HHS”) declares that an emergency use authorization is appropriate, the FDA may authorize unapproved medical products or unapproved uses of approved medical

1 products to be used in an emergency to diagnose, treat, or prevent serious or life-threatening
 2 diseases or other threats when certain criteria are met, including where there are no adequate,
 3 approved, and available alternatives.

4 44. According to the FDA, the EUA “authority allows FDA to help strengthen the
 5 nation’s public health protections . . . infectious diseases, by facilitating the availability and use
 6 of medical countermeasures (MCMs) needed during public health emergencies.” In the recent
 7 past, the FDA issued EUAs for Anthrax Vaccine Adsorbed, H1N1 (i.e., swine flu), Middle East
 8 Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus (MERS-CoV), Ebola Virus, and Zika Virus.

9 45. On January 31, 2020, the Secretary of HHS issued a Determination that a Public
 10 Health Emergency Exists and declared: “As a result of confirmed cases of 2019 Novel
 11 Coronavirus (2019-nCoV) . . . a public health emergency exists and has existed since January 27,
 12 2020, nationwide.” On February 4, 2020, the Secretary of HHS issued another determination that
 13 “Circumstances Exist Justifying Authorizations Pursuant to Section 564(b) of the FD&C Act.”
 14 And on March 27, 2020, with an effective date of February 4, 2020, the Secretary of the HHS
 15 declared that the FDA Commissioner could issue EUA for drugs and biological products for
 16 emergency use under section 564 of the FD&C Act.”

17 46. The FDA recommends that an EUA request contain safety and efficacy data for a
 18 product, among other categories of information. While clinical trials are not required for an EUA
 19 submission, they are recommended for otherwise unapproved products, such as Ivermectin.
 20 Further, the FDA “encourages any [applicant] of a candidate product to have early discussions
 21 with FDA . . . about the nature and type of safety data that might be appropriate.”

22 3. “Emergency” and Expanded Access/Compassionate Use

23 47. The FDA’s “emergency use” exemption allows the use of a test article on a
 24 human subject in a life-threatening situation in which no standard acceptable treatment is
 25 available, and there is not sufficient time to obtain Institutional Review Board (“IRB”) approval.

26 48. Separately, according to the FDA, expanded access, sometimes called
 27 “compassionate use,” involves the use of an investigational new drug product outside of clinical
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1 trials to treat patients with serious or immediately life-threatening diseases or conditions when
2 there are no comparable or satisfactory alternative treatment options.

3 49. This mechanism is primarily intended to give seriously ill patients access to
4 experimental drugs or devices where no comparable or satisfactory alternative treatment is
5 available. Although the test article applicant is expected to continue conventional clinical trials
6 and pursue marketing approvals with due diligence, expanded access studies involve systematic
7 use of experimental treatments, and, with very rare exceptions, require rigorous review and
8 approval, including both IRB approval and FDA approval in the form of an IND Application
9 (drug/biologic).

10 **B. The Company Pins Its Hopes For A Marketable Product On Leronlimab**

11 50. CytoDyn's financial success, e.g., earning any revenue, let alone profits, hinged
12 on the Company's ability to obtain regulatory approval to market and sell leronlimab. Indeed,
13 CytoDyn articulated various "Risks Related to Our Business." For example, in risk disclosures
14 published on August 14, 2019, CytoDyn stated:

15 We have not generated any revenue from product sales, licensing, or other
16 potential sales to date. Since our inception, we have incurred operating losses in
17 each year due to costs incurred in connection with research and development
18 activities and general and administrative expenses associated with our operations.
19 Our current drug candidate, leronlimab, is in the later stages of clinical trials and
20 the filing of a BLA is underway. During the fiscal years ended May 31, 2019 and
21 2018, we incurred net losses of approximately \$56.2 million and \$50.1 million,
22 respectively, and at May 31, 2019, we had an accumulated deficit of
23 approximately \$229.4 million and a stockholders' deficit of \$8.9 million. We
24 expect to incur losses for the foreseeable future as we continue development of,
25 and seek regulatory approvals for, our drug candidate and commercialize any
26 approved product usages. If our current drug candidate fails to gain regulatory
27 approval, or if it or other candidates we own do not achieve approval and market
28 acceptance, we will not be able to generate any revenue, or explore other
opportunities to enhance stockholder value, such as through a sale. If we fail to
generate revenue and eventually become and remain profitable, or if we are
unable to fund our continuing losses, our shareholders could lose all or part of
their investments.

51. Absent any revenues from its business, in the years preceding the COVID-19
pandemic, CytoDyn had been constrained to fund its operations through various alternative
financing arrangements with less than reputable partners.

C. CytoDyn's Financials

52. The Company has not shown any revenue and it has incurred operating losses each fiscal year due to costs of research and development activities. From 2019 to 2020, the Company's losses nearly doubled from \$56.2 million in 2019 to \$124.4 million in 2020. The Company's annual net losses:

FY	Net Losses
2012	\$7,474,224
2013	\$9,568,301
2014	\$12,431,413
2015	\$25,088,070
2016	\$25,703,612
2017	\$25,763,801
2018	\$50,149,681
2019	\$56,186,660
2020	\$124,403,402

53. The Company's deficit also increased from \$229.4 million in 2019 to \$354.7 million in 2020. In 2020, the Company's financials were so bad that the Company's auditor reported a "going concern" warning:

Our auditors issued an opinion, which includes a going concern exception, in connection with the audit of our annual financial statements for the fiscal year ended May 31, 2020. A going concern exception to an audit opinion means that there is substantial doubt that we can continue as an ongoing business for the next 12 months. If we are unable to continue as a going concern, we might have to liquidate our assets and the values we receive for our assets in liquidation or dissolution could be significantly lower than the values reflected in our financial statements. In addition, the inclusion of an explanatory paragraph regarding substantial doubt about our ability to continue as a going concern and our lack of cash resources may materially adversely affect our share price and our ability to raise new capital or to enter into critical contractual relations with third-parties. There is no assurance that we will be able to adequately fund our operations in the future.

D. The Company Needs to Convince the Market it Can Regulatory Approval to Market Leronlimab

54. The Company's long-term ability to survive turned on obtaining regulatory approval to market and sell leronlimab. Investors had no other reason to invest money in the Company. Defendants had represented that the Company's efforts to achieve such approval for a BLA for an HIV indication ("HIV BLA") were making substantial progress. On July 16, 2018,

1 CytoDyn announced the results for its pivotal Phase 3 trial studying the use of leronlimab in a
2 combination therapy to treat HIV.

3 55. In March 2019, the *Portland Business Journal* reported that Defendant
4 Pourhassan stated that the Company “would file the full [BLA] application by the end of 2019
5 and would have revenue in 2020.”

6 56. On August 5, 2019, the Company reported progress on the HIV BLA submission
7 with the FDA when it stated that it was granted “a small business waiver of application fees by”
8 the FDA for the forthcoming HIV BLA. Moreover, Defendants stated in an October 11, 2019
9 press release that the FDA agreed to provide the Company with a “Fast Track” designation for
10 the HIV BLA.

11 57. Also, on November 21, 2019, in a press release the Company stated that it had
12 “successfully completed a Phase 3 pivotal trial with leronlimab in combination with standard
13 anti-retroviral therapies in HIV-infected treatment-experienced patients. CytoDyn plans to seek
14 FDA approval for leronlimab in combination therapy and plans to complete the filing of a
15 Biologics License Application (BLA) in 2019 for that indication.”

16 58. On December 16, 2019, the FDA communicated specific data and information
17 that the Company needed to include in the leronlimab BLA:

18 We acknowledge that you have selected 700 mg as the to be marketed dose.
19 Assessing whether the data from CD03 and CD02 support the 700 mg dose for the
20 intended population and indication will be a review issue. With your BLA
21 submission, you should submit an integrated assessment and detailed summary
22 that supports your selected dose and incorporates virologic outcomes, safety data
23 (including laboratory abnormalities), exposure related data (including population
24 pharmacokinetics and exposure-response relationship analyses),
25 receptor occupancy data (including both method validation report and
26 bioanalytical report of clinical samples), and anti-idiotypic antibody data
27 (including both method validation report and bioanalytical report of clinical
28 samples). The integrated assessment should reflect data from the 3 doses
evaluated in CD03 and for the 350 mg dose evaluated in HTE MDR patients in
CD02.

59. The Company did not share this communication or guidance, nor other specific
guidance it had previously received from the FDA, with the market until October 26, 2021.

60. On December 17, 2019, the Company issued a press release stating that it had “entered into a Commercialization and License Agreement (CLA) and a related Supply Agreement to commercialize leronlimab (PRO 140) in the U.S. for the treatment of HIV [with Vyera Pharmaceuticals, LLC]” and:

Under the terms of the CLA, CytoDyn will maintain responsibility for the development and FDA approval of leronlimab for all HIV-related and other indications, while Vyera has been granted an exclusive license to market and distribute leronlimab in the U.S. for the treatment of HIV. In exchange for such exclusive license, Vyera has agreed to pay upfront and regulatory and sales-based milestone payments of up to \$87.5 million, as well as a royalty of 50 percent on net sales. Vyera also agreed to make an investment in CytoDyn of \$4 million in the form of registered CytoDyn common stock.

61. On January 13, 2020, after missing its stated goal to file the HIV BLA in 2019, the Company issued a press release that stated: “CytoDyn plans to seek FDA approval for leronlimab in combination therapy and plans to complete the filing of a [BLA] in the first quarter of 2020 for that indication.” The Company issued identical statements in subsequent press releases from January through March 2020.

62. On January 21, 2020, the Company announced that [it] “has successfully completed a Phase 3 pivotal trial with leronlimab in combination with standard anti-retroviral therapies in HIV-infected treatment-experienced patients. CytoDyn plans to seek FDA approval for leronlimab in combination therapy and plans to complete the filing of a [BLA] in the first quarter of 2020 for that indication.”

63. However, at the end of the first quarter of 2020, the Company pushed the submission target date again. On March 30, 2020, the Company stated that “CytoDyn plans to seek FDA approval for leronlimab in combination therapy and plans to complete the filing of a [HIV BLA] in April of 2020 for that indication.” The Company issued identical statements in ten subsequent press releases over the following three weeks.

E. The Company Finally Submits BLA Despite Knowledge That It Lacks Required Data and Information

64. In an e-mail to the BLA project heads, Defendant Pourhassan demanded that the application be submitted regardless of the internally well-known gaps and data deficiencies it

1 contained. On April 14, 2020, Defendant Pourhassan sent an e-mail to Kush Dhody, Kazem
2 Kazempour, and Nitya Ray (the Company's Chief Technology Officer):

3 Dear Nitya and Kush:

4 Today we have so far in 1 hour almost 20% drop in our stock price. Yesterday we
5 had drop also after putting out great results about COVID-19 patients we are
seeing these type of decline.

6 This drop will be much deeper if we don't file our BLA as the message board now
7 is getting bombarded by investors who are very frustrated with me and CytoDyn.

8 ***Please file the BLA no later than next week Wednesday, even if we are short in
no matter what portion of whatever it is that we are short.***

9 Dear Nitya: Please communicate with Kush about how much time they need to
10 prepare the CMC² portion after you send it to them. Kush told me yesterday he
needs one week if so, they need the CMC package tomorrow to make the next
11 week's Wednesday deadline. Please talk to Kush to see if there is any way they
could take 1-2 days to prepare the CMC portion for final filling as you and I
discussed yesterday.

12 Dear Kush: The COVID-19 is no longer CytoDyn's top priority as if the stock
13 continues its drift then financially we will have problems financing itself. ***THE
MOST IMPORTANT thing now is BLA. Please focus on that urgently only.***

14 65. Defendant Pourhassan's April 14, 2020 e-mail only became public in October 26,
15 2021, in a lawsuit entitled *CytoDyn, Inc. v. Amarex Clinical Research, LLC, et al.*, No. 21-cv-
16 02533 (D. Md. Oct. 4, 2021).

17 66. Despite a plethora of deficiencies in the submission package about which
18 Defendants knew but did not disclose to market, Defendants caused the Company to submit the
19 HIV BLA to the FDA in late April 2020.

20 67. On April 27, 2020, the Company issued a press release entitled *CytoDyn Submits
21 Completed Biologics License Application (BLA) to the FDA for Leronlimab as a Combination
22 Therapy for Highly Treatment Experienced HIV Patients*. It was in that press release that
23 Defendant Pourhassan stated:

24 With the BLA filing for a combination therapy now complete, we are continuing
25 our efforts on commercialization-readiness, as well as advancing leronlimab in

26 ² "CMC" refers to the "Chemistry Section: (A) Chemistry, manufacturing, and controls
27 information (e.g., 21 CFR 314.50(d)(1); 21 CFR 601.2)" requested in connection with a BLA.

1 the other important therapeutic areas of COVID-19, cancer and immunology.
 2 ***The BLA filing is a monumental achievement for our Company.*** . .

3 68. Also, on April 27, 2020, during a Company conference call with investors,
 4 Defendant Pourhassan stated:

5 [H]ave some exciting news for the use of leronlimab in treating patients infected
 6 with COVID-19. . .

7 ***

8 The first update is the BLA submission, which is a historical achievement for
 9 CytoDyn.

10 As everyone knows, the BLA timeline was pushed back constantly. These push-
 11 backs were all due to CytoDyn's success. The first success is with a higher dose
 12 of leronlimab in monotherapy. Then it got pushed back because of the success of
 13 leronlimab application in coronavirus and overwhelming interest from hospitals
 14 and patients to get leronlimab, which led to initiation of two new clinical trials,
 15 which takes a tremendous amount of work from our CRO and our CytoDyn team.

16 Then it got pushed back because of the coronavirus shutdown of the lab side, and
 17 even the manufacturing of leronlimab that shorted [out] the availability of our
 18 stability data from AGC.

19 ***

20 Our success with cancer also contributed to our delay of the BLA.

21 ***

22 The good news is, CytoDyn just filed the full BLA last night without slowing
 23 down our cancer programs, without slowing down our impressive work in
 24 coronavirus, and without blinking on the tremendous financial pressure from
 25 everywhere.

26 ***

27 Congratulations to Am[a]rex for not letting down all of our shareholders and
 28 many patients in great need of leronlimab. Special thanks goes to Dr. [Kush
 Dhody] and the main person at Am[a]rex, their CEO, Dr. [Kazem Kazempour],
 and to CytoDyn's team, especially our Chief Technology Officer, Dr. Nitya Ray
 who took the CMC shattered pieces and successfully put it back together in an
 artistic fashion; and in doing so, he also finalized a superb deal for CytoDyn with
 Samsung Biologics. ***So in short, ladies and gentlemen, the BLA is submitted.***

It is very important, as CytoDyn's story gets unfolded, that shareholders realize
 the value that one man has brought to us, and he is CytoDyn's chairman of the
 board and chief medical officer, Dr. Scott Kelly. As the CEO of CytoDyn, I
 went through a lot of challenges in the last eight years, and without Dr. Kelly,
 most of our victories would not been [sic] possible. ***The BLA got filed.***

1 (Second set of brackets in original.)

2 69. On April 30, 2020, in a Company press release, the Company affirmed: “CytoDyn
3 completed the filing of its BLA in April 2020 to seek FDA approval for leronlimab as a
4 combination therapy for highly treatment experienced HIV patients.”

5 70. On April 30, 2020, May 1, 2020 and May 4, 2020 after the Company
6 announcement mentioned below, Defendant Pourhassan reaped over \$15 million in insider sales
7 proceeds.

8 71. On May 1, 2020, Defendant Kelly reaped over \$3.9 million in insider sales
9 proceeds.

10 72. Defendants Pourhassan and Kelly were motivated in whole, or in part, to make
11 these sales while in possession of adverse material nonpublic information regarding the deficient
12 BLA for leronlimab.

13 73. Only a few days after Defendants Pourhassan’s and Kelly’s combined \$16.3
14 million in sales, the Company issued a press release regarding its request for compassionate use
15 clearance for leronlimab to treat COVID-19, whereby the Company stated: “[w]e would like to
16 provide an update that the Biologics License Application (BLA) for Leronlimab as a
17 Combination Therapy for Highly Treatment Experienced HIV Patients will be considered
18 completed after the clinical datasets are submitted on May 11, 2020.” This was the first
19 disclosure to inform the market of shortcomings with the HIV BLA submission. As a result, the
20 Company’s stock price fell approximately 13% on the news on May 4, 2020.

21 74. On May 6, 2020 and May 7, 2020, the Company issued press releases repeating
22 the same information, and on May 8, 2020, the Company issued a press release that stated, “[t]he
23 BLA will not be considered completed until the Company submits to the FDA clinical datasets
24 required to address FDA comments it received in March 2020, as described in the Company’s
25 press releases on May 4 and May 6, 2020. CytoDyn expects to submit these clinical datasets on
26 May 11, 2020.”

75. On May 15, 2020, the Company issued a press release stating: “[t]he Company filed its BLA for Leronlimab as a Combination Therapy for Highly Treatment Experienced HIV Patients with the FDA on April 27, 2020, and submitted additional FDA requested clinical datasets on May 11, 2020.”

76. Defendants then extolled the so-called progress of the application and positive feedback the Company received from the FDA. For instance, during a June 5, 2020, Proactive Investors interview, Defendant Pourhassan reported that CytoDyn was communicating with the FDA regarding the BLA and “had the discussion with the [FDA] just a few days ago, very, very positive discussions.”

1. The FDA Rejects the Company’s HIV BLA Submission in a Non-Public RTF Letter

77. On July 8, 2020, the FDA informed the Company in a non-public communication that it had rejected the Company’s HIV BLA submission, and provided the Company with an RTF notification:

After a *preliminary review*, we find your application does not contain all pertinent information and data needed to complete a substantive review. Therefore, we are refusing to file this application under 21 CFR 601.2(a).

The application has numerous omissions and inadequacies *so severe* as to render the application incomplete and also introduces significant impediments to a prompt and meaningful review because there is the need for substantial amounts of additional data and analyses along with corrections in datasets.

We are refusing to file this application for the reasons identified below. Section I provides a high-level summary of the deficiencies and Section II provides a detailed description of each deficiency and the information needed to resolve the deficiency.

78. The substance of the RTF Letter was not disclosed to the market at that time. The RTF Letter was not made public until October 26, 2021, in *CytoDyn, Inc. v. Amarex Clinical Research, LLC, et al.*, No. 21-cv-02533 (D. Md. Oct. 4, 2021).

79. Among other points, the FDA RTF Letter noted:

The BLA *does not include critical information and analyses* needed to permit substantive clinical, statistical, clinical virology and clinical pharmacology review of your proposed dose. In many cases, these issues are deficiencies that were clearly communicated to you before submission of the application (*see* Section II

1 for specific details). These deficiencies require resolution before a meaningful
2 review can occur.

3 80. The FDA RTF Letter also noted:

4 There is an absence of important variables (*e.g.*, time to virologic failure at the
5 assigned dose) and analysis group flags in the analysis files containing the
6 primary efficacy data needed for substantive clinical, statistical, clinical virology
and clinical pharmacology review of your product. Additionally, the datasets
have numerous instances of missing data and the files are not adequately defined
or properly indexed.

7 81. The FDA RTF Letter further noted:

8 Assessing the safety and effectiveness in subpopulations (sex, age, race, and
9 ethnicity) is an integral part of the BLA review. Your BLA did not include
10 analyses of subpopulations with regard to effectiveness; the Summary of Clinical
11 Efficacy, the CD02 CSR, and the CD03 CSR did not include these analyses and
12 the ISE was omitted from the submission. While the ISS and Summary of Clinical
13 Safety included sections with relevant titles such as “Adverse Events by Age” and
“Adverse Events by Gender”, the content of these sections was largely line-
listings without substantive assessments addressing whether age or sex appeared
to have impacted safety outcomes in your clinical development program. Neither
the ISS nor the Summary of Clinical Safety includes analyses of safety by race or
ethnicity.

14 82. The FDA RTF Letter also noted that “[n]o data from studies conducted with the
15 drug in the device were included in the submission, and no information is included on the
16 manufacturer of the syringe and needles.”

17 83. The FDA RTF Letter further explained that, on December 16, 2019, it had
18 expressly told the Company:

19 We acknowledge that you have selected 700 mg as the to be marketed dose.
20 Assessing whether the data from CD03 and CD02 support the 700 mg dose for the
21 intended population and indication will be a review issue. With your BLA
22 submission, you should submit an integrated assessment and detailed summary
23 that supports your selected dose and incorporates virologic outcomes, safety data
24 (including laboratory abnormalities), exposure related data (including population
25 pharmacokinetics and exposure-response relationship analyses),
receptor occupancy data (including both method validation report and
bioanalytical report of clinical samples), and anti-idiotypic antibody data
(including both method validation report and bioanalytical report of clinical
samples). The integrated assessment should reflect data from the 3 doses
evaluated in CD03 and for the 350 mg dose evaluated in HTE MDR patients in
CD02.

26 84. The FDA RTF Letter further stated:

27 Despite the specific advice above, which echoed the advice we provided you on
28 January 22, 2019, following our presentation of the revised BLA submission plan

1 to the CDER's Medical Policy and Program Review Council (MPPRC), the BLA
 2 includes only a 2-page "Rationale for Dose Section" that is identical to the
 3 rationale you provided with the proposed CD08 trial, which we told you in our
 4 June 3, 2019, correspondence was insufficient.

5 *Your application does not include the information and analyses needed to*
 6 *permit FDA reviewers (clinical, statistical, clinical virology and clinical*
 7 *pharmacology) to perform a substantive review of the proposed dose.* The
 8 application is *missing* an integrated assessment that incorporates detailed
 9 summaries reflecting data from the participants randomized to receive 350 mg,
 10 525mg, and 700mg in CD03 and for the 350 mg dose evaluated in HTE MDR
 11 patients in CD02. Furthermore, your application does not include multiple reports
 12 that are needed to permit a substantive review.

13 85. The FDA RTF Letter also provided detailed descriptions concerning the
 14 deficiencies in the Company's BLA.

15 **2. The Company Tries To Deflect The Substance Of The RTF Letter**

16 86. On July 13, 2020, the Company disclosed that it had received the RTF Letter from
 17 the FDA for the HIV BLA. However, Defendants concealed that they had submitted (and
 18 resubmitted) the HIV BLA even though they knew it lacked critical information. Defendants
 19 also concealed that they had knowingly submitted (and resubmitted) the application with
 20 inadequate supporting data on Defendant Pourhassan's express orders.

21 87. On July 13, 2020, on this news, the price of the Company's stock dropped by
 22 \$1.03 per share—nearly 22%—from a close of \$4.73 on July 10, 2020 to a close at \$3.70 on July
 23 13, 2020.

24 88. After the July 13, 2020 news was revealed to the market, the Defendants assured
 25 investors that the issues the FDA identified with the rejected BLA were not significant.

26 89. On July 13, 2020, the Company held a Conference Call where Defendant
 27 Pourhassan reported: "[t]oday's call is to explain the letter from the FDA requesting information
 28 about our BLA filing that has received a Refuse-to-File and did not get the PDUFA date":

In 2018, CytoDyn announced that the company had hit its primary endpoint in the
 HIV indication for the MDR population — multi drug-resistant population.

In 2019, CytoDyn met with the FDA on a pre-BLA meeting, and was able to
 receive a rolling review for its BLA submission. FDA also requested the BLA

1 submission should be for a higher dose of 700 milligrams, since the company had
2 shown success with a 700 milligram dose as compared to a 350 milligram dose.

3 ***

4 The FDA requested CytoDyn to enroll at least fifty patients and obtain data at 24
5 weeks with the 700 milligram dose in CD03, which is our monotherapy trial to
6 demonstrate safety of the 700 milligram dose. CytoDyn achieved this in October
7 2019, and the BLA included information about CD03 trial for the safety portion
8 of the BLA.

9 ***

10 *CytoDyn felt the application was completed for the FDA to provide the PDUFA*
11 *date.*

12 90. However, Defendants left out critical information about the data the HIV BLA
13 was missing, attempting to hide the substance of the FDA's RTF Letter from the market.
14 Specifically, during the July 13, 2020 Conference Call noted above, analyst Robert Smith asked:
15 "[i]n the interest of being clear and transparent, why not just share the FDA letter with us, with
16 the shareholders?" Defendant Pourhassan responded: "[L]et me answer the first question.
17 Sharing the FDA letter with the whole public, Now no company that I know give the shareholder
18 the FDA communication to the public."

19 91. On January 29, 2021, the Company issued a press release, reporting that it had
20 "been working diligently to refile its [BLA] for this HIV combination therapy since receiving a
21 Refusal to File in July 2020 and subsequently meeting with the FDA telephonically to address
22 their written guidance concerning the filing. CytoDyn expects to refile its BLA in the first half of
23 calendar year 2021." The Company expressed the same message through eight subsequent press
24 releases between February and April, 2021.

25 92. On February 18, 2021, the SEC sent Defendant Mulholland (the CFO of the
26 Company), a letter ("SEC Feb. Letter") regarding the Company's Form 10-K for the Fiscal Year
27 ended May 31, 2020. In the SEC Feb. Letter, the SEC issued targeted inquiries regarding the
28 Company's BLA: (1) the timeline of the Company's communications with the FDA prior to
submitting the BLA; (2) how the RTF impacted the Company's timing in respect to efforts to
capitalize inventory with respect to leronlimab; (3) the nature of additional information required

by the FDA in order to resubmit the BLA; and (4) “why your projected date for resubmitting the BLA keeps slipping.”

93. On March 23, 2021 the Company responded to the SEC Feb. Letter. Then, on April 16, 2021, the SEC issued another letter to Defendant Mulholland (“SEC April Letter”), which claimed that asserted certain responses of the Company failed to sufficiently respond to the SEC’s inquiries, including responses “to support management’s assertion that prelaunch inventory represented an asset at each date it was capitalized” and questioned the appropriateness of the Company’s capitalization conclusions:

- You assert that your meetings with the FDA addressed safety and efficacy of the drug. However, the FDA’s July 2020 Refusal to File letter states that your Biologics License Application omitted information necessary for the FDA to perform a substantive review of the product’s safety and effectiveness.
- You indicate that “. . . current scientific work being performed by the Company to complete a successful resubmission of the Company’s BLA” is ongoing and that you do not expect to resubmit your BLA until mid- calendar year 2021 or shortly thereafter.
- You assert that you manufactured leronlimab consistent with cGMP standards. However, we note that the FDA’s September 20, 2020, response to your list of questions related to the Refusal to File letter continued to reference issues with your clinical and statistical data, device related issues, and chemical manufacturing and control related issues.

94. On May 19, 2021, the SEC sent Defendant Mulholland another letter (“SEC May Letter”). It was in that SEC May Letter that the SEC requested the Company respond to the questions concerning the BLA and also to “[e]nsure you also discuss and update the risks and uncertainties surrounding market acceptance and salability of leronlimab in your future periodic reports.”

F. As The HIV BLA Fails, The Company Shifts Its Focus To COVID-19

95. Prior to January 2020, the Company was a small microcap biotech company, trading on the OTC at well under \$1.00 per share. For many years, Defendants unsuccessfully sought FDA approval to sell leronlimab to treat HIV patients. However, the Company’s HIV BLA had already been delayed months—if not years, due to Defendants’ disregard for FDA filing requirements.

1 96. The COVID-19 pandemic presented Defendants with a perfect opportunity to
2 commit a stock promotion scheme that increased the price of the Company's common shares by
3 900%, permitting certain defendants to sell tens of millions of Company shares at historically
4 high prices.

5 **1. Defendants' COVID-19 Scheme**

6 97. According to the SEC: "[m]icrocap stocks" like this Company "may be
7 particularly susceptible to stock promotion schemes," including pump-and-dump schemes.
8 "Fraudsters who conduct stock promotions are often . . . company insiders who stand to gain by
9 selling their shares after creating a buying frenzy and pumping up the stock price."

10 98. Defendants had implemented an infrastructure to create a buying frenzy
11 manufactured by false, misleading, and otherwise unsubstantiated statements and promotional
12 efforts. First, Defendants increased the number of press releases they caused the Company to
13 issue. Historically, the Company issued 30-40 press release in a calendar year. In 2019, the
14 number of press releases the Company issued nearly doubled to 70. In 2020, the number of press
15 releases the Company issued doubled again to 130. The press releases generally contained at
16 least one quote from Defendant Pourhassan, and often quotes from Defendant Kelly. Following
17 these press releases, Defendants held conference calls with investors during which they
18 expanded upon false and misleading statements contained within the press releases.

19 99. Despite the Company's lack of revenues, Defendants engaged numerous stock
20 promotion websites and services. Defendants paid these stock promotion websites and services
21 to: (a) reissue and amplify the Company's press releases and investor calls; (b) generate friendly
22 interviews of Defendants that resembled materials generated by independent media outlets; (c)
23 host or otherwise moderate calls with investors and the audience of the promotional outlet; (d)
24 issue biased articles and reports reflecting and expanding upon Defendants' false and misleading
25 statements and promotional efforts; and (e) respond to and counteract any negative press about
26 leronlimab.

1 100. Defendants also issued millions in stock options and warrants to themselves and
2 sold millions of shares on material inside information withheld from the market.

3 **2. Defendants Purport to Explore The Use Of Leronlimab To Treat**
4 **COVID-19**

5 101. The Company issued the first of more than 150 press releases regarding COVID-
6 19 on January 28, 2020, reporting that the Company was “exploring leronlimab as a potential
7 treatment for [COVID-19] patients.” Defendant Pourhassan stated that he “look[ed] forward to
8 advancing discussions with potential partners to study leronlimab as a [COVID-19] treatment
9 option.”

10 102. On February 4, 2020, the SEC’s Office of Investor Education and Advocacy
11 issued an Investor Alert entitled *Look Out for Coronavirus-Related Investment Scams*. The SEC
12 had reported that it had “become aware of a number of Internet promotions . . . claiming that the
13 products . . . of publicly-traded companies can prevent, detect, or cure coronavirus, and that the
14 stock of these companies will dramatically increase in value as a result.”

15 103. Ten days after reporting that the Company was “exploring” leronlimab as a
16 potential COVID-19 treatment, Defendants reported on a February 6, 2020 call with the market
17 that they were looking for a partner in China to license leronlimab.

18 104. On February 12, 2020, the Company issued a press release announcing that it had
19 signed a “nonbinding letter of intent for the joint development and licensing of leronlimab in
20 China with Longen China Group.”

21 105. During a February 24, 2020 interview posted on the Wall Street Reporter website,
22 Defendant Pourhassan confirmed that the “Longen Group” “is working with us right now to get”
23 COVID-19 patients treated with leronlimab. Defendant Pourhassan also stated that the Company
24 was working on another unspecified letter of intent and term sheet and had been “approached . . .
25 by other countries which we will be announcing very soon our agreement with them.”

26 106. On March 5, 2020, a conference call was held by the Company. It was during this
27 call that Defendant Pourhassan reported:
28

1 The next update is in regard to the anticipated timing of potential approval for
 2 TFDA Taiwan's FDA of leronlimab for the treatment of cancer[,] HIV[,] and
 3 coronavirus[.] [W]e have already signed a letter of intent and NDA . . . with a
 4 company which we are not naming at this time in Taiwan. The next update is
 5 about doing the same kind of thing in China that we talked about in Taiwan we
 6 already have translated all of our documents that we gave to Longen Group and
 7 they already indicated that they have submitted it to ask so things and that record
 8 have already progress.

9 ***

10 The next up update is an overview of doing licensing opportunities. We having
 11 licensing opportunities with several countries so in regards to Longen China
 12 group, which we announced, we signed a LOI Letter of Intent and NDA. Nine
 13 days from today the letter of intent will expire. So they are trying to finish up the
 14 final agreement, final term sheet and agreement which we have seen. We are
 15 working with them to finish as much as we can, fast as we can. So in regards to
 16 the licensing agreement with another company which is a very solid company
 17 with financial background located in Taiwan. We will be announcing something
 18 shortly with them. We have signed LOI and NDA with them all so now both of
 19 these companies are right now talking to us to buy every bit of leronlimab that we
 20 have in commercial vials which is 24,000 vials [N]ow two different entity
 21 wants to purchase it and they want to also enter into an agreement to purchase the
 22 rest of that. This will come to the point where we will be short of the [vials]
 23 especially with coronavirus if we have positive results in the next few weeks
 24 hopefully.

25 107. On this same conference call, Dr. Bruce Patterson ("Dr. Patterson"), a paid
 26 Company consultant, reported: "I was in China in January and they were pleased to be able to
 27 talk to CytoDyn and no[w] hear about the possibility of bringing leronlimab over to China and
 28 now Taiwan . . . first . . . to address the coronavirus situation." Dr. Patterson also stated that "the
 HIV data and the cancer data" have "[a]ll . . . been submitted to both the CFDA in China and the
 TFDA in Taiwan as part of an ongoing process to get drug approval over there for coronavirus."

108. However, nothing came to pass concerning the Longen letter of intent or talks
 with South Korea, China, or Taiwan.

109. As a result, Defendants started to promote their efforts to obtain FDA approval for
 leronlimab to treat COVID-19. In a March 9, 2020 press release the Company reported that it
 had filed with the FDA an IND Application to conduct a Phase 2 clinical trial of leronlimab for
 treatment of COVID-19 in adult patients with mild-to-moderate COVID-19 symptoms ("Phase 2
 Trial (CD10)").

110. Following these statements, the Company's promotional machine issued further content regarding the above. For instance, Emerging Growth and Wall Street Reporter republished the March 9, 16, and 23, 2020 press releases on their respective websites. On March 9, 2020, Proactive Investors interviewed Defendant Pourhassan. During the interview, Defendant Pourhassan touted leronlimab as "a solution to coronavirus" and that "[the Company was] are working with other companies right now . . . overseas for this problem."

111. On March 10, 2020, Medical News First ("MN1") posted an article by Pat Monarch entitled *CytoDyn's Vyr[o]logix [leronlimab] to Fight COVID-19 – Hoping to Treat Phase 2 and 3 COVID-19 Patients*. The MN1 article hyped the Company and the use of leronlimab to treat COVID-19.

112. On March 19, 2020, Wall Street Reporter featured Defendant Pourhassan. Defendant Pourhassan made statements about the Company's efforts with respect to COVID-19. On March 23, 2020, an Emerging Growth report expanded upon Defendant Pourhassan's narrative regarding leronlimab's efficacy and safety for COVID-19.

3. As Defendants' COVID-19 Promotional Efforts Continue, Defendants Pourhassan, Mulholland and Kelly Sell \$30 Million in Company Common Stock

113. After knowingly filing a materially incomplete HIV BLA on or around April 27, 2020, Defendants doubled-down on their scheme to inflate the price of the Company's common stock by touting leronlimab for COVID-19. Defendants Pourhassan, Mulholland and Kelly sold millions of Company shares for proceeds of more than \$30 million beginning April 30, 2020:

Defendant	Date	Number of Shares	Price	Proceeds
Pourhassan	4/30/20	2,219,837	\$3.53	\$7,838,688.41
	5/1/20	1,399,685	\$3.26	\$4,569,132
	5/4/20	1,201,652	\$2.79	\$3,353,089.74
	7/31/20	156,570	\$4.97	\$778,152.90
	<i>Subtotal</i>			<i>\$16,539,063.05</i>
Mulholland ³	12/17/20	32,000	\$4.55	\$145,673.60
	12/18/20	487,002	\$4.95	\$2,411,439.10

³ According to the Form 4 disclosing these transactions, Mulholland's sales were executed pursuant to a Rule 10b5-1 plan entered into on November 12, 2020.

	12/21/20	585,797	\$5.58	\$3,269,918.85
	12/22/20	245,704	\$5.4938	\$1,349,848.64
	12/22/20	453,997	\$6.6146	\$3,003,008.56
	12/22/20	12,100	\$7.00	\$84,700
	<i>Subtotal</i>			<i>\$10,264,588.75</i>
Kelly	5/1/20	1,200,000	\$3.26	\$3,912,480
	<i>Subtotal</i>			<i>\$3,912,480</i>
	Total			\$30,716,131.80

114. On April 24, 2020, the Company issued a press release reporting that it would update investors on its HIV BLA and COVID-19 efforts on the next trading day. The price of the Company's stock rose 16%. During an April 27, 2020 conference call, Defendant Pourhassan stated: "[t]o have a solution against COVID-19 is to save humanity from a powerful plague . . . and that brings us to today's most powerful news of CytoDyn's history. In the past, I thought . . . that the BLA filing would be the biggest news of CytoDyn's history. We have news that is by far much larger than the BLA. So allow me to update you on our fight against COVID-19 with leronlimab."

115. Defendant Pourhassan claimed that "[b]lood sample analysis of the first [New York-based COVID-19] patients . . . revealed some exciting news." Defendant Pourhassan reported the results as "impressive" and, later, "remarkable," and stated that "we expect probably several publications surrounding these findings to be out in the next few days and weeks." With respect to the FDA, Defendant Pourhassan also stated: "[w]hen 200 companies run to [the FDA and] say, 'hey, we got the solution to coronavirus! Please say something positive so our stock can go up,'" the FDA "get[s] worried" but "they have given us everything we have asked for."

116. On April 27, 2020, the Company's stock price increased 17%.

117. On April 30, 2020, the Company issued a press release stating "strong results from eIND COVID-19 patients treated with leronlimab." According to the Company: "54 eINDs [have been] approved by [the U.S.] FDA and 49 patients have been treated with leronlimab this far."

118. In this April 30, 2020 press release, the Company also reported "important powerful results from the effect of leronlimab were demonstrated in almost all of these patients,"

1 and “[t]his data has been submitted to a prestigious journal and *we expect the publication on*
2 *Friday, May 1.*” Defendant Pourhassan reported the publication as “our first major paper very
3 close to publication” and hinted at another publication “shortly thereafter.”

4 119. At the same time, Defendants’ paid promotional outlets were hard at work.
5 Emerging Growth and Proactive Investors reissued the Company’s press releases. On April 30,
6 2020, Proactive Investor uploaded an interview with Defendant Pourhassan on its website and
7 YouTube. It was during this interview that Defendant Pourhassan promoted the eIND results as
8 “really, really amazing.” Defendant Pourhassan further claimed that the Company was
9 “reporting almost 95% or so rate of [eIND] patients being alive and doing better and improved . .
10 . that’s a spectacular result[.]. And we wanted to make sure everybody knows that.” In another
11 May 6, 2020 Proactive Investor interview, Defendant Pourhassan reported that “Dr. Patterson
12 has . . . statistically significant data that means he took the blood of these [eIND] patients and
13 showed why leronlimab work[s]. That should put a lot of doubters’ minds at ease that, hey, the
14 mechanism of action is clear.”

15 120. On May 1, 2020, Wall Street Reporter held a “Next Super Stock” livestream
16 where both Defendant Pourhassan and Dr. Patterson participated. When Wall Street Reporter
17 asked Defendant Pourhassan “[w]hy is it so hard for the FDA to realize how many lives can be
18 saved by using leronlimab?” Defendant Pourhassan replied “please don’t point fingers at [the]
19 FDA at the time that they’re doing a fantastic job separating two hundred companies from the
20 real to fiction. *Obviously, they believe that we have something here.* That’s why they’ve been
21 giving us face to face . . . and approval left and right . . . one after another.” Further, Dr.
22 Patterson stated “we’re looking at the data on how the drug works on COVID and saying, hey,
23 the drug is doing what it’s supposed to be doing and that’s statistically significant. So we have
24 great, great confidence that because it’s been embedded into the trial design that we’re going to
25 have a positive outcome.”

26 121. By this point, Defendant Pourhassan had just reaped \$7.8 million in insider sales
27 and continued to sell massive amounts of stock shortly thereafter. Indeed, the same day
28

1 Defendant Pourhassan was touting leronlimab and its multiple approvals, he dumped almost 1.4
2 million shares reaping \$4.5 million. Defendant Kelly followed suit and dumped 1.2 million
3 shares of Company common stock on May 4, 2020.

4 **4. Defendants Report That The Trial Has Failed To Meet Its Primary**
5 **Endpoint**

6 122. After falsely promoting the results of the Company's first COVID-19 trial of
7 leronimab, the Phase 2 Trial or CD10, for weeks, Defendant Pourhassan confirmed on July 17,
8 2020 that the Phase 2 Trial test results were "unblinded now." The next day, July 18, 2020,
9 during an interview that was posted to YouTube, Defendant Pourhassan confirmed that the Phase
10 2 Trial data was unblinded and "with Amarex" and that he was "hoping to be able to get results
11 on Monday [July 20, 2020] and have a press release on Tuesday [July 21, 2020]." Defendant
12 Pourhassan also speculated: "if we get beautiful results right now, I think the whole world will
13 pay attention."

14 123. On the trading day after Defendant Pourhassan's above interview on Youtube, the
15 price of the Company's common stock rose 16%.

16 124. On July 21, 2020, the Company issued a press release reporting "impressive
17 results" from the Company's Phase 2 COVID-19 trial. Proactive Investors reissued this press
18 release on its website. Despite having access to both efficacy and safety data, Defendants chose
19 to tout only the patient safety data, claiming that they still needed to complete "the statistical
20 analyses of all primary and secondary endpoints." According to the July 21, 2020 press release
21 "34% (19 of 56 patients) treated with leronlimab compared to 50% (14 of 28 patients) treated
22 with placebo reported at least one adverse event" and with respect to 19 serious adverse events
23 (SAEs), there were more reported with the placebo (11) than with leronlimab (8), and "[n]one of
24 the SAEs in the leronlimab arm were deemed related to study drug administration by the
25 investigators." In the press release Defendant Kelly emphasized leronlimab's purported safety
26 record, noting that while patients taking leronlimab experienced fewer SAEs than patients taking
27
28

1 the placebo, “[p]rior drugs in clinical trials for the treatment of COVID-19 [i.e., Gilead’s
2 remdesivir] have resulted in an increase in SAEs in the drug treated arm versus placebo.”

3 125. That same day, Proactive Investor posted an interview of Defendant Pourhassan
4 on its website and YouTube. During the interview, Defendant Pourhassan reported that “what is
5 missing,” e.g., the efficacy data, “is amazing.” Defendant Pourhassan further claimed that the
6 Phase 2 Trial (CD10) safety data “itself could be an efficacy for us because . . . that’s a fantastic
7 result.” Defendant Pourhassan continued “people in the world will now start catching up and
8 we’re going to have more data putting out and they’re going to realize that we are very serious
9 about getting approval for leronlimab.” With respect to the Phase 2 Trial (CD10) efficacy data,
10 Defendant Pourhassan stated that the Company had “something that could shake the world” and
11 that the delay in releasing the efficacy data was due to his “regulatory team and biostatiscian”
12 requesting “time to put this in the right format.”

13 126. During a special meeting of the Company’s shareholders on July 22, 2020,
14 Defendant Pourhassan reported “we are very close to be able to submit some solid data [for] our
15 therapy for COVID-19 to the FDA for consideration — for final approval in two separate
16 populations: mild-to-moderate . . . critical and severe.” Defendant Pourhassan further stated that
17 “[w]e will stay visible, transparent, and we will report honestly everything that happened in our
18 company as frequently as possible, like usual.” Defendant Pourhassan continued “we can’t wait
19 to put out the efficacy results”; “we will send to the FDA the whole package [of Phase 2 Trial
20 (CD10) data] and request emergency approval for this indication based on unmet medical need
21 — the nature of this pandemic that we’re living right now . . . we might be a few weeks away
22 from potential approval.”

23 127. On July 30, 2020, Defendants held an investor conference call. Regarding the
24 CD10 results, Defendant Pourhassan reported “we do have positive efficacy results. . . . In
25 regards to our primary endpoint, . . . [w]e have seen improvement in day three versus day zero.”

26 128. During the July 30, 2020 call, Defendant Pourhassan also reported that “no one
27 has ever received any positive efficacy results better than placebo in this population in a
28

1 randomized double-blinded FDA trials.” Defendant Pourhassan also reported “you just heard a
 2 fantastic result that nobody has heard, even FDA doesn’t have that.” Defendant Pourhassan
 3 called the results “excellent.”

4 129. That same day, Emerging Growth issued a report entitled *CytoDyn’s (CYDY)*
 5 *100% Above Market Offering Stuns the Street*. Regarding the Phase 2 Trial safety data, the
 6 report stated that “[t]he market has really been disconnected from reality with respect to its
 7 comprehension of the safety data . . . the safety data from the CD10 trial was jaw dropping . . .
 8 leronlimab was about as safe as drinking water.” According to Emerging Growth “[t]he lack of
 9 *SAE’s is an absolute indication of efficacy and likelihood that they met their primary*
 10 *endpoint*. In ANY randomized double blind placebo controlled study a reduction in SAE’s . . .
 11 could be a consideration for approval.” (Emphasis in original.) The report concluded “[i]nvestors
 12 need to wake up and realize that CYDY won the game.”

13 130. On July 31, 2020, Proactive Investors interviewed Defendant Pourhassan, posting
 14 the interview on its website and YouTube. During the interview, Defendant Pourhassan stated
 15 “[w]e have a product that has shown very strong results. Today we have to all look for positive
 16 things that any drug can do and be united. And what we have right now” is “a very positive
 17 result” for the National Early Warning Score 2 scale, a secondary endpoint of the Phase 2 Trial,
 18 “we think we had a jackpot with that.” Pourhassan claimed, “[i]n regards to [the] [P]hase 2
 19 [Trial], this is not a primary endpoint hit or miss phase 3 is where it’s do or die.”

20 131. On August 11, 2020, the Company issued a press release, announcing Phase 2
 21 Trial or CD10 “top-line” results, calling them “clinically significant.” Proactive Investors
 22 reissued this press release on its website. In the press release, the Company reported that
 23 leronlimab did not achieve the primary endpoint. Indeed, the Company reported that the primary
 24 endpoint of the Phase 2 Trial (CD10) “show[ed] early clinical improvement in symptom score at
 25 Day 3 in patients receiving leronlimab” and that “leronlimab also demonstrated statistically
 26 significant improvement versus placebo in [a] key secondary efficacy endpoint, National Early
 27 Warning Score 2 scale (NEWS2).” The press release quoted Defendant Pourhassan: “Patients
 28

1 receiving leronlimab showed a statistically significant improvement using NEWS2 clinical
2 parameters. We will make a case for immediate approval of leronlimab for this population of
3 COVID-19 patients, not only in the U.S., but in the U.K. and other countries around the world.”
4 The press release also quoted Defendant Kelly stating “The decreased probability in serious
5 adverse events, as well as overall adverse events with leronlimab compared to placebo further
6 supports the use of leronlimab as a treatment option for COVID-19.”

7 132. The fact that the Company had missed the primary endpoint for the Phase 2 Trial
8 was not lost on the market, with the stock price declining throughout the day on August 11,
9 2020.

10 133. During the August 12, 2020 investor conference call, Defendant Pourhassan
11 reported that “[a]s of about an hour ago, CytoDyn has requested from the FDA to grant CytoDyn
12 an emergency use authorization for leronlimab based on CD10 data.” Defendant Pourhassan
13 further claimed “we are very excited to file for emergency use authorization in many different
14 countries.” However, Defendant Pourhassan was forced to admit that the Phase 2 Trial (CD10)
15 had not met its primary endpoint:

16 Did we meet our primary endpoint? Meeting your primary endpoint – that means
17 you have a clinically significant value, and if . . . the value is much better in the
18 drug versus placebo, then that becomes statistically significant. If it’s not
19 statistically significant, but clinically significant, then your Phase 3 will do the
20 same thing as Phase 2, but with a higher number of patients. So we had that
21 situation. We had the primary endpoint in regards to clinical significance.

22 134. On August 12, 2020, Proactive Investors posted an interview of Defendant
23 Pourhassan on its website and YouTube. It was in this interview that Defendant Pourhassan
24 reported that the Phase 2 Trial (CD10) “results have been fantastic”; “[t]he problem we have is
25 people don’t understand . . . clinical trials, especially laymen, investors. So let me make it very
26 clear. The results were fantastic.” Defendant Pourhassan also reported: “[n]ow, the primary
27 endpoint [for CD10] was clinically significant. What does that mean? . . . The difference was
28 90% versus 70%. If you go to a hospital” and the “rate of getting better” using leronlimab was
“90% . . . versus 70% . . . everybody would take that. It’s clinically significant.” With respect to

1 potential FDA approval based on CD10, Defendant Pourhassan reported “So let’s talk about best
2 case versus worst case. Best case is when [in a] pandemic, mild to moderate is [an] unmet
3 medical need. [...] So if the FDA chooses to look at these [CD10] results,” and “say, OK,” they
4 have clinical significance and “the safety was spectacular. Let’s give them emergency approval.
5 That would be fantastic.” Pourhassan concluded, “I don’t see how anybody in their right mind
6 with one first grade educated person can come over here and say this was bad news about the
7 results.”

8 135. Defendants’ false and misleading statements and promotional efforts continued
9 after August 12, 2020. On August 17, 2020, the Company announced that it had submitted the
10 “top-line report” from the Phase 2 Trial to the FDA and “requested emergency use approval” for
11 leronlimab to treat COVID-19 solely on that basis. In an August 19, 2020 press release,
12 Defendants continued to spin the results of the Phase 2 Trial, relying on the fact that it had
13 demonstrated statistical significance in one secondary endpoint to baldly assert that CytoDyn had
14 “statistically significant efficacy findings.”

15 136. Defendants’ false and misleading statements and promotional efforts regarding
16 the Phase 2 Trial (CD10) results were repeated by the Company’s paid promotional outlets. For
17 example, in an August 17, 2020 Proactive Investors interview, Defendant Pourhassan reported
18 that “there is a lot of negative talk about our company and we are under attack from negative
19 people that are very negative about CytoDyn . . . [our] stock has gone down.” Regarding the
20 CD10 trial, Defendant Pourhassan reported “there are two outcomes. Worst case, best case. Best
21 case is the FDA will . . . say . . . [EUA] is granted” and “worst case scenario, we do a Phase 3”
22 trial and “hopefully have approval by the end of the year. I don’t know what else we could do
23 to make sure that everybody knows that this is really strong results.” Defendant Pourhassan
24 further reported “we . . . look forward to surpris[ing] everybody . . . wh[en] we g[e]t emergency
25 use authorization” in the U.K. or the U.S.”

26 137. Neither the FDA nor the U.K. MHRA granted the Company emergency use
27 authorization of leronlimab for COVID-19. Further, despite informing the market on August 17,
28

1 2020 that the Company had formally requested an EUA for leronlimab based solely on the Phase
2 2 Trial (CD10) results, Defendant Pourhassan changed the narrative again, reporting that the
3 Company had not submitted anything formally to the FDA, but rather had requested its
4 “opinion” about whether an EUA could be granted on the strength of the Phase 2 Trial (CD10)
5 results.

6 **5. As The Phase 2 Trial Missed Its Primary Endpoint, Defendants**
7 **Switched to Promoting the Company’s Phase 3 Trial Results**

8 138. With its Phase 2 Trial (CD10) missing its primary endpoint, Defendants focused
9 their false and misleading statements and promotional efforts to several new areas, including (i)
10 the Company’s Phase 2b/3 Trial (CD12); (ii) non U.S. regulatory pathways to
11 approval/authorization; and (iii) a new potential treatment population.

12 139. On August 4, 2020, the Company announced that it had received a positive Drug
13 Safety Monitoring Committee (“DSMC”) recommendation on the CD12 safety data. In an
14 August 17, 2020 press release, Defendant Pourhassan reported to be “in discussions with several
15 regulatory agencies in other countries and hope to obtain emergency approval for its use” and the
16 Company “hope[ed]” that it would “obtain emergency use approval from the MHRA in the U.K.,
17 EMA in the European Union, as well as the regulatory authorities in the Philippines.” Also, with
18 respect to COVID-19, the Company reported that it had “been approached by several doctors
19 about a clinical study of leronlimab in long-hauler COVID-19 individuals” for which “[t]he
20 Company is preparing a Phase 3 protocol and will file it as soon as possible.”

21 140. On August 19, 2020, the Company reported that it had sent the CD10 “top-line
22 report” to the U.K. MHRA and “requested the regulatory pathway for Fast Track approval noting
23 the efficacy and safety results from the Phase 2 trial.” A day later, on August 20, 2020, the
24 Company issued another press release, reporting that the U.K. MHRA had “authorized the
25 Company to enroll for its ongoing” Phase 3 Trial, after “several months of its review of
26 CytoDyn’s manufacturing processes and leronlimab’s safety profile.” Thereafter, the price of the
27 Company’s stock increased 25% over two trading days.
28

141. On August 25, 2020, the Company reported that it had “reached the requisite number of enrolled patients in its Phase 3 [T]rial” such that it could “perform an interim analysis following the 28 day phase of the trial.” Defendant Pourhassan stated:

We are eager to perform an interim analysis of the data and remain optimistic the interim results will be consistent with those experienced by patients who received leronlimab through multiple eINDs (over 60) previously authorized by the FDA. And, in the event we are successful, we are well positioned with our distribution partner to accelerate distribution of leronlimab to patients throughout the U.S.

G. The Truth Begins To Emerge

142. On August 26, 2020, *The Wall Street Journal* reported that CytoDyn was not under consideration for Operation Warp Speed.⁴ According to a senior federal official, “CytoDyn had only completed a preliminary qualification for being included in the initiative.” Specifically, CytoDyn had submitted information through CoronaWatch, a program run by the Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority to assess the viability of drugs and therapeutics that might be effective against COVID-19. Technical experts had reviewed the submission and opted not to proceed further at this time, the official confirmed. Moreover, the official noted that the team reviewing the submissions had made clear to companies that the submissions are for informational purposes only and do not by themselves lead to funding; companies must apply to specific grant programs to receive funding, which CytoDyn had not done.

143. On this news, the Company’s share price fell \$0.66, or 17%, over two consecutive trading sessions to close at \$3.15 per share.

144. With the walls closing in, Defendants attempted to keep the stock price artificially inflated. On September 2, 2020, the Company reported that the U.K. MHRA granted it a meeting to discuss its request for Fast Track approval of leronlimab to treat COVID-19. Defendants also held a conference call on that day with investors to discuss its COVID-19 efforts. The

⁴ <https://www.wsj.com/articles/small-biotech-stock-cytodyn-soars-on-warp-speed-comment-11598456736>

1 Company's stock price increased 38% over four consecutive trading days (September 2-4 and 8,
2 2020).

3 145. On September 3, 2020, the SEC filed suit against Iliad, Iliad's principal John Fife
4 ("Fife"), and certain Fife-related entities (Chicago Venture Partners L.P., St. George Investments
5 LLC, Tonaquint, Inc., and Typenex Co-Investment, LLC). Specifically, the SEC alleged that
6 Iliad and its related entities operated as unregistered securities dealers in violation of the federal
7 securities laws by buying convertible promissory notes, converting the notes into newly issued
8 shares of stock, then rapidly selling those shares into the public at a profit. Calling Fife a
9 "recidivist violator of the federal securities laws," the SEC alleged that these entities violated the
10 mandatory dealer registration requirements of the federal securities laws. *See Securities and*
11 *Exchange Commission v. John M. Fife, et al.*, Case No. 1:20-cv-05227, Complaint (N.D. Ill.
12 Sept. 3, 2020). Iliad had operated as an unregistered securities dealer and generated substantial
13 profits by, among other things, entering into the convertible promissory note with CytoDyn,
14 converting the note into newly issued shares, and selling them into the market at a profit.

15 146. On September 16, 2020, defendant Pourhassan admitted that no formal EUA
16 request had been made to the FDA. Instead, CytoDyn had only asked for the FDA's opinion,
17 with defendant Pourhassan stating "we did not submit a formal letter to FDA saying we want to
18 get Emergency Use Authorization. We asked them for their opinion and they were not positive
19 about it. Their reasoning made a lot of sense to us." *See Moon Kil Woong, CytoDyn's Update*
20 *Provides A Clear Path Towards Approval With Up-Listing Potential Still In The Cards,*
21 *TALKMARKETS* (Sept. 18, 2020).

22 147. On September 17, 2020, CytoDyn was sued by a stock promoter called Shift
23 Media Lab for the failure to pay for its stock promotion services. In its complaint filed in the
24 11th Judicial Circuit for the Miami-Dade County, Florida, Shift Media Lab alleged that it had
25 provided "services" to CytoDyn for three months at \$25,000 per month. According to CytoDyn's
26 disclosure statement to the OTCQB Venture Market, Shift Media Lab provided "Brand
27 Awareness" for CytoDyn.

1 148. On November 10, 2020, CytoDyn entered into an amended \$28.5 million Secured
 2 Convertible Promissory Note with Fife's company, Streeterville Capital LLC, a related entity
 3 that was not specifically named in the SEC action against Iliad and Fife.

4 149. On this news, the Company's stock price closed at \$2.02, representing an 80%
 5 decline from its highs during the wrongdoing.

6 150. On March 5, 2021, after the market closed, CytoDyn began issuing press releases
 7 that described the results of Phase IIb/III testing data for Leronlimab for the treatment of
 8 COVID-19. Masked by positive titles, these releases disclosed that the primary endpoint for the
 9 study (lowering all-cause mortality at Day 28) was not statistically significant. For example, in a
 10 press release entitled "CytoDyn to File Accelerated Rolling Review with MHRA and Interim
 11 Order (IO) with Health Canada for COVID-19," the Company stated:

12 ***Amongst all patients in mITT, the primary endpoint (all-cause mortality at Day***
 13 ***28) was not statistically significant.*** When age adjustment was conducted, the
 14 primary endpoint was much closer to statistically significant value. Of note, the
 15 reduction of mortality in this population of 65 years and younger leronlimab arm
 16 had more than 30% less mortality than placebo and 9% less mortality in
 17 participants over 65.

18 151. With the age adjustment analysis in all other major secondary endpoints, there
 19 was consistent numerical superiority over the placebo group, with some secondary endpoints
 20 approaching statistical significance.

21 152. On this news, the Company's share price fell \$1.14, or 28%, to close at \$2.91 per
 22 share on March 8, 2021. On March 9, 2021, CytoDyn shares dropped an additional 19% to close
 23 at \$2.35 per share.

24 153. On May 17, 2021, the FDA took the nearly unprecedented step of issuing a public
 25 statement on an unapproved drug:

26 FDA recognizes the substantial public interest in medicines that are being studied
 27 for the prevention or treatment of COVID-19, especially those medicines that may
 28 provide a benefit to patients with the most severe forms of disease that can result
 in respiratory failure and death. Leronlimab, a monoclonal antibody
 investigational drug under development by CytoDyn, Inc. (CytoDyn), is one of
 the potential medicines that has been studied to determine whether it is safe and
 effective in treating patients with COVID-19, including those with severe
 outcomes from COVID-19.

1 * * *

2 With the conclusion of both the CD10 and CD12 clinical trials, *it has become*
 3 *clear that the data currently available do not support the clinical benefit of*
 4 *leronlimab for the treatment of COVID-19.* In the smaller study that CytoDyn
 5 conducted in patients with mild-to-moderate COVID-19 disease (CD10), there
 6 was no observed effect of the drug on the study's primary endpoint or on any of
 7 the secondary endpoints.... Additionally, none of the secondary endpoints were
 8 met in this study, including mortality, time to symptom resolution, and time to
 9 return to normal activity. Taken together, the CD10 results indicate that most
 10 study participants experienced resolution in COVID-19 symptoms regardless of
 11 whether they received leronlimab or placebo

12 * * *

13 *CytoDyn has publicly communicated differences in small subgroups from the*
 14 *CD12 trial (e.g., a sub-group analysis of 62 of the 394 patients studied)*
 15 *suggesting that the data demonstrated a mortality benefit in certain patients*
 16 *who had received leronlimab. Subgroup analyses have well-established*
 17 *limitations, especially in the context of a clinical trial that has failed to show a*
 18 *benefit in the overall study population.... None of these analyses met statistical*
 19 *significance when using established and reliable analytical methods that correct*
 20 *for multiple comparisons.* However, as noted above, such analyses may inform
 21 the design of future clinical trials investigating leronlimab for the treatment of
 22 COVID-19

23 154. On July 30, 2021, the Company disclosed the investigations by the SEC and U.S.
 24 Department of Justice. The Company has received "subpoenas from the SEC requesting
 25 documents and information concerning, among other matters, leronlimab, the Company's public
 26 statements regarding the use of leronlimab as a potential treatment for COVID-19 and related
 27 communications with the FDA, investors, and others, and trading in the securities of CytoDyn."
 28 In addition, the Company and certain of Defendants received subpoenas in connection with an
 investigation being conducted by the United States Department of Justice. The "subpoenas seek
 testimony and/or records concerning, among other matters, leronlimab, the Company's public
 statements regarding the use of leronlimab as a potential treatment for COVID-19 and related
 communications with the FDA, investors, and others, and trading in the securities of CytoDyn."

29 **V. THE COMPANY'S CORPORATE GOVERNANCE**

30 155. As members of the Company's Board, the law holds the Director Defendants to
 31 the highest standards of honesty and integrity and charges them with overseeing the Company's
 32

1 business practices and policies and assuring the integrity of the Company's financial and
2 business records.

3 156. The conduct of the Director Defendants complained of herein involves a knowing
4 and culpable violation of their obligations as directors and officers of the Company, the absence
5 of good faith on their part, and a reckless disregard for their duties to the Company and its
6 investors that the Director Defendants were aware posed a risk of serious injury to the Company.

7 **A. The Audit Committee Charter**

8 157. According to the Company's 2019 proxy statement filed August 21, 2019, "[t]he
9 primary role of the Audit Committee is to oversee the financial reporting and disclosure
10 process."

11 158. The Company maintains an Audit Committee Charter. The Audit Committee
12 Charter states in relevant part:

13 To review with management and the Company's independent auditors the
14 adequacy and effectiveness of the Company's financial reporting processes,
15 internal control over financial reporting and disclosure controls and procedures,
16 including any significant deficiencies or material weaknesses in the design or
17 operation of, and any material changes in, the Company's processes, controls and
18 procedures and any special audit steps adopted in light of any material control
19 deficiencies, and any fraud involving management or other employees with a
20 significant role in such processes, controls and procedures, and review and
21 discuss with management and the Company's independent auditors disclosure
22 relating to the Company's financial reporting processes, internal control over
23 financial reporting and disclosure controls and procedures, the independent
24 auditors' report on the effectiveness of the Company's internal control over
25 financial reporting, where applicable, and the required management certifications
26 to be included in or attached as exhibits to the Company's annual report on Form
27 10-K or quarterly report on Form 10-Q, as applicable.

28 159. The purpose of the Audit Committee is to assist the Company's Board in its
oversight of accounting, financial reporting and disclosure processes and adequacy of systems of
disclosure and internal controls. The wrongful conduct of the Director Defendants complained
of herein violates the Charter of the Audit Committee.

29 **B. Duties Of The Director Defendants**

30 160. By reason of their positions as officers and/or directors of the Company, and
31 because of their ability to control the business and corporate affairs of the Company, the Director
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1 Defendants owed the Company and its investors the fiduciary obligations of trust, loyalty, and
2 good faith. The obligations required the Director Defendants to use their utmost abilities to
3 control and manage the Company in an honest and lawful manner. The Director Defendants
4 were and are required to act in furtherance of the best interests of the Company and its investors.

5 161. Each director of the Company owes to the Company and its investors the
6 fiduciary duty to exercise loyalty, good faith, and diligence in the administration of the affairs of
7 the Company and in the use and preservation of its property and assets. In addition, as officers
8 and/or directors of a publicly held company, the Director Defendants had a duty to promptly
9 disseminate accurate and truthful information regarding the Company's operations, finances, and
10 financial condition, as well as present and future business prospects, so that the market price of
11 the Company's stock would be based on truthful and accurate information.

12 162. To discharge their duties, the officers and directors of the Company were required
13 to exercise reasonable and prudent supervision over the management, policies, practices, and
14 controls of the affairs of the Company. By virtue of such duties, the officers and directors of the
15 Company were required to, among other things:

16 (a) ensure that the Company complied with its legal obligations and
17 requirements, including acting only within the scope of its legal authority
18 and disseminating truthful and accurate statements to the SEC and the
19 investing public;

20 (b) conduct the affairs of the Company in an efficient, businesslike manner so
21 as to make it possible to provide the highest quality performance of its
22 business, to avoid wasting the Company's assets, and to maximize the
23 value of the Company's stock;

24 (c) properly and accurately guide investors and analysts as to the true
25 financial condition of the Company at any given time, including making
26 accurate statements about the Company's business prospects, and ensuring
27 that the Company maintained an adequate system of financial controls
28

1 such that the Company's financial reporting would be true and accurate at
2 all times;

3 (d) remain informed as to how the Company conducted its operations, and,
4 upon receipt of notice or information of imprudent or unsound conditions
5 or practices, make reasonable inquiries in connection therewith, take steps
6 to correct such conditions or practices, and make such disclosures as
7 necessary to comply with federal and state securities laws;

8 (e) ensure that the Company was operated in a diligent, honest, and prudent
9 manner in compliance with all applicable federal, state and local laws, and
10 rules and regulations; and

11 (f) ensure that all decisions were the product of independent business
12 judgment and not the result of outside influences or entrenchment motives.

13 163. Each Director Defendant, by virtue of his or her position as a director and/or
14 officer, owed to the Company and to its shareholders the fiduciary duties of loyalty, good faith,
15 and the exercise of due care and diligence in the management and administration of the affairs of
16 the Company, as well as in the use and preservation of its property and assets. The conduct of
17 the Director Defendants complained of herein involves a knowing and culpable violation of their
18 obligations as directors and officers of the Company, the absence of good faith on their part, and
19 a reckless disregard for their duties to the Company and its shareholders that the Director
20 Defendants were aware, or should have been aware, posed a risk of serious injury to the
21 Company.

22 164. The Director Defendants breached their duties of loyalty and good faith by
23 causing the Company to issue false and misleading statements concerning the business
24 opportunities, results, and prospects of the Company. As a result, the Company has expended,
25 and will continue to expend, significant sums of money related to investigations and lawsuits.
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27
28

1 **VI. ADDITIONAL FALSE STATEMENTS**

2 165. During 2020 and into 2021, even after the truth had begun to emerge, Defendants
 3 caused the Company to make a series of materially false and misleading statements regarding:
 4 (a) the HIV BLA; (b) the efficacy and safety of leronlimab for COVID-19; and (c) the results of
 5 the Phase 2 Trial (CD10) and Phase 2b/3 Trial (CD12).

6 **A. The HIV BLA**

7 166. On April 9, 2020, the Company filed a Form 10-Q for the fiscal quarter ended
 8 February 29, 2020. In the Form 10-Q, the Company stated:

9 The Company's inventory as of February 29, 2020 and May 31, 2019 was
 10 \$15,895,589 and \$0, respectively. Inventory as of February 29, 2020 consisted
 11 solely of specialized raw material purchased for use in the commercial
 12 manufacturing of pre-launch inventories of Vyrologix to support the Company's
 13 expected approval of the product as a combination therapy for HIV patients in the
 14 United States. The Company believes that all material uncertainties related to the
 15 ultimate regulatory approval of Vyrologix for commercial sale have been
 16 significantly reduced based on positive data from Phase III clinical trial results,
 17 information gathered from pre-filing meetings with the Food and Drug
 18 Administration for the Biologics License Application ("BLA"), and the
 19 Company's anticipated filing of the BLA with the FDA targeted for the end of
 20 April 2020.

21 167. On April 27, 2020, the Company released a press release entitled, *CytoDyn*
 22 *Submits Completed Biologics License Application (BLA) to the FDA for Leronlimab as a*
 23 *Combination Therapy for Highly Treatment Experience HIV Patients*. In that press release, the
 24 Company stated that "CytoDyn completed the filing of its BLA in April 2020 to seek FDA
 25 approval for leronlimab as a combination therapy for highly treatment experienced HIV
 26 patients."

27 168. In that same press release, Defendant Pourhassan stated that "[w]ith the BLA
 28 filing for a combination therapy now complete, we are continuing our efforts on
 commercialization-readiness, as well as advancing leronlimab in the other important therapeutic
 areas of COVID-19, cancer and immunology. The BLA filing is a monumental achievement for
 our Company."

1 169. On April 27, 2020, the Company issued another press release entitled, *CytoDyn*
2 *Announces Vyrologix as Proprietary Name for Leronlimab as a Combination Therapy for Highly*
3 *Treatment Experienced HIV Patients in the United States*. The press release stated: “CytoDyn
4 completed the filing of its BLA in April 2020 to seek FDA approval for leronlimab as a
5 combination therapy for highly treatment experience HIV patients.”

6 170. On that same day, during a Company Investor Community Call, Defendant
7 Pourhassan reported that: (a) “The first update is the BLA submission, which is a historical
8 achievement for CytoDyn . . .”; (b) “The good news is, CytoDyn just filed the full BLA last
9 night”; (c) “So in short, ladies and gentlemen, the BLA is submitted”; and (d) “The BLA got
10 filed.”

11 171. A few days later, on April 29, 2020, the Company issued a press release entitled
12 *CytoDyn’s Drs. Pourhassan and Patterson to Present Live at Wall Street Reporter’s Event to*
13 *Discuss Paper Recently Submitted for Publication and Positive Results of eIND COVID-19*
14 *Patients*. The press release stated that the Company had “completed the filing of its BLA in
15 April 2020 to seek FDA approval for leronlimab as a combination therapy for highly treatment
16 experienced HIV patients.”

17 172. The next day, on April 30, 2020, the Company issued a press release entitled
18 *CytoDyn Reports Strong Results from eIND COVID-19 Patients Treated with Leronlimab;*
19 *Majority of Patients Have Demonstrated Remarkable Recoveries* in which the same language
20 was implemented.

21 173. On May 4, 2020, the Company issued a press release entitled *FDA Approves*
22 *Emergency INDs for Leronlimab Treatment of Coronavirus CytoDyn Requests Compassionate*
23 *Use from FDA for COVID-19 Patients Not Eligible for Participation in Two Ongoing Clinical*
24 *Trials in U.S. – CytoDyn Targets Enrollment Completion for its 75 Patient, Phase 2 Trial by End*
25 *of May*. The press release stated that “[the BLA] will be considered completed after the clinical
26 datasets are submitted on May 11, 2020.”

1 174. On May 6, 2020, the Company issued a press release entitled *Manuscript*
 2 *Describes How CytoDyn's Leronlimab Disrupts CCL5/RANTES-CCR5 Pathway, Thereby*
 3 *Restoring Immune Homeostasis, Reducing Plasma Viral Load, Reversing Hyper Immune*
 4 *Activation and Inflammation in Critical COVID-19 Patients*. The press release stated that “[w]e
 5 would like to provide an update that the Biologics License Application (BLA) for Leronlimab as
 6 a Combination Therapy for Highly Treatment Experienced HIV Patients will be considered
 7 completed after the clinical datasets are submitted on May 11, 2020. The clinical datasets are
 8 updated to address FDA comments for mock datasets from March 12 and March 20, 2020.”

9 175. On May 8, 2020, the Company issued a press release entitled “*CytoDyn Clarifies*
 10 *Status of Biologics License Application* in which it stated: (a) “The BLA will not be considered
 11 completed until the Company submits to the FDA clinical datasets required to address FDA
 12 comments it received in March 2020, as described in the Company’s press releases on May 4 and
 13 May 6, 2020. CytoDyn expects to submit these clinical datasets on May 11, 2020”; (b) “The
 14 Company filed its BLA for Leronlimab as a Combination Therapy for Highly Treatment
 15 Experienced HIV Patients to the FDA on April 27, 2020”; and (c) “CytoDyn filed its BLA in
 16 April 2020 to seek FDA approval for leronlimab as a combination therapy for highly treatment
 17 experienced HIV patients, and plans to submit additional datasets needed to complete the BLA
 18 on May 11, 2020.”

19 176. On May 13, 2020, the Company issued a press release entitled *CytoDyn*
 20 *Completed Submission of All Remaining Parts of Biologics License Application (“BLA”)* on May
 21 11, 2020. The press release stated that the Company “confirmed” that “on May 11, 2020, it
 22 submitted all remaining parts of the Company’s Biologics License Application (‘BLA’) for
 23 leronlimab as a combination therapy with HAART for highly treatment experienced HIV
 24 patients to the [FDA]. Pursuant to FDA guidelines, CytoDyn informed the FDA it had submitted
 25 a complete BLA for rolling review.”

26 177. The Company further stated in the May 13, 2020 press release that “[t]he
 27 Company filed its BLA for Leronlimab as a Combination Therapy for Highly Treatment
 28

1 Experienced HIV Patients to the FDA on April 27, 2020 and submitted the additional FDA
2 requested clinical datasets on May 11, 2020.”

3 178. And, the Company further stated in the May 13, 2020 press release that “CytoDyn
4 filed its BLA in April 2020 to seek FDA approval for leronlimab as a combination therapy for
5 highly treatment experienced HIV patients, and submitted additional FDA requested clinical
6 datasets on May 11, 2020.”

7 179. On May 15, 2020, the Company issued a press release entitled, *CytoDyn to Offer*
8 *No-Cost Exploratory Laboratory Testing for Childhood Inflammatory Disease Associated with*
9 *COVID-19*. The press release stated that “[t]he Company filed its BLA for Leronlimab as a
10 Combination Therapy for Highly Treatment Experienced HIV Patients with the FDA on April
11 27, 2020, and submitted additional FDA requested clinical datasets on May 11, 2020” and
12 “CytoDyn filed its BLA in April 2020 to seek FDA approval for leronlimab as a combination
13 therapy for highly treatment experienced HIV patients, and submitted additional FDA requested
14 clinical datasets on May 11, 2020.”

15 180. The Company made identical statements to the market in press releases issued on
16 (and titled): (i) May 18, 2020 (*CytoDyn to Prepare a Phase 3 Protocol to Submit to the FDA for*
17 *a Three-Arm Comparative and Combination Trial of Leronlimab and Remdesivir*); (ii) May 19,
18 2020 (*CytoDyn and the Mexican National Institutes of Health Participate in a Collaborative*
19 *Study of Leronlimab for the Treatment of Severe/Critical COVID-19 Population*); (iii) June 1,
20 2020 (*CytoDyn Files Request With FDA for Priority Review of BLA for First Approval*); (iv)
21 June 8, 2020 (*CytoDyn Receives BLA Acknowledgment Letter From the FDA*); (v) June 11, 2020
22 (*CytoDyn Reached Its Enrollment Target for Phase 2 COVID-19 Trial for Mild to Moderate*
23 *Indication – Primary End Point Announcement Is Next*); (vi) June 11, 2020 (*CytoDyn Initiates*
24 *Phase 2 Clinical Trial with Leronlimab for Treatment of Nash*); (vii) June 29, 2020 (*CytoDyn*
25 *and NIH of Mexico Complete Memorandum of Understanding to Conduct Small Covid-19 Phase*
26 *3 Trial for Severe and Critically Ill Patients*); (viii) July 2, 2020 (*CytoDyn Releases Mechanism*
27 *of Action Animation for Leronlimab in Immuno-Oncology*); (ix) July 3, 2020 (*CytoDyn*
28

1 *Announces Execution of Exclusive Agreement with American Regent for Distribution and Supply*
 2 *of Leronlimab for Treatment of COVID-19 in United States); (x) July 6, 2020 (CytoDyn*
 3 *Announces Execution of Exclusive Agreement with American Regent for Distribution and Supply*
 4 *of Leronlimab for Treatment of COVID-19 in United States); and (xi) July 7, 2020 (CytoDyn's*
 5 *Leronlimab Prevents Transmission of SHIV in Macaque Study).*

6 181. On May 15, 2020, during an interview, Defendant Pourhassan stated that the
 7 "BLA [was] already submitted."

8 182. On May 20, 2020, during an interview, Defendant Pourhassan stated that he
 9 believed the HIV BLA was a "complete package."

10 183. On May 26, 2020, during an interview, Defendant Pourhassan stated that the HIV
 11 BLA was "submitted with rolling review."

12 184. On July 4, 2020, in statements made during an interview entitled, Leronlimab
 13 Discussion with Dr. Been, Defendant Pourhassan reported:

14 We said in, I believe April 27th, that we submitted the full BLA. FDA
 15 immediately said 'no, we don't agree'. And we immediately set [sic] to the public
 16 that it is not completed. It's going to be completed in a few more days, and it
 17 was.

18 185. On July 8, 2020, the Company issued two press releases. In those press releases
 19 the Company reported:

20 "CytoDyn filed its BLA in April 2020 to seek FDA approval for leronlimab as a
 21 combination therapy for highly treatment experienced HIV patients, and
 22 submitted additional FDA requested clinical datasets on May 11, 2020."

23 186. The statements set forth in ¶¶166-185 were false and misleading when made
 24 because Defendants knew or were reckless in not knowing that the Company lacked various
 25 types of data that were critical to the HIV BLA and was not capable of submitting a complete
 26 HIV BLA in the time frame specified. For instance, the Company did not possess data,
 27 information, or analyses the FDA had expressly stated were required to be submitted in the HIV
 28 BLA, including: (a) complete bioanalytical reports; (b) full validation data for all PPQ lots
 analyzed; (c) complete CCR5 receptor occupancy data for 350 mg, 525 mg, and 700 mg doses;

1 (d) analyses of Anti-Drug Antibodies (ADA) or any assessment of association between ADA and
2 virlogic failure; and (e) multiple reports needed for the FDA to permit a substantive review.
3 Thus, the statements about the anticipated submission date of the HIV BLA in April 2020 and
4 reporting that the Company did not have evidence that the HIV BLA would be denied, and the
5 Company's counting of its leronlimab supplies as an inventory asset, lacked a reasonable basis in
6 fact.

7 187. Moreover, the statements set forth above in ¶¶166-185 reporting that the BLA
8 was; e.g., "complete" and/or "completed," "filed," and/or "submitted" were false and misleading.
9 Specifically, at the time these statements were issue, the Company misrepresented, concealed,
10 and/or failed to disclose that:

11 (a) The CEO of Amarex, the Company's CRO that was performing the
12 overall development of the HIV BLA, including managing multiple data analyses and essential
13 projects, specifically warned Defendant Pourhassan prior to April 14, 2020 that the HIV BLA
14 was incomplete;

15 (b) On April 14, 2020, Defendant Pourhassan ordered that the HIV BLA be
16 submitted in April 2020 regardless of known shortcomings. In an April 14, 2020 e-mail,
17 Pourhassan directed the BLA be filed in April 2020 "no matter what portion of whatever it is that
18 we are short." As Amarex's CEO has stated in a sworn declaration: "Pourhassan directed
19 Amarex to file the BLA prematurely, knowing it was incomplete, lacking in appropriate content
20 and not ready for submission";

21 (c) The Company (and HIV BLA) lacked data that the FDA had expressly
22 told the Company in the June 2018 Pre-BLA Meeting must be included in a complete application
23 "at the time of the BLA submission," including "complete bioanalytical reports" and "full
24 validation data from all PPQ lots";

25 (d) The Company (and HIV BLA) lacked data that the FDA had expressly
26 told the Company in the December 14, 2018 teleconference must be included in a complete
27
28

1 application, including “data from studies conducted with the drug in the device,” and
2 “information on the manufacturer of the syringe and needles”;

3 (e) The Company (and HIV BLA) lacked data that the FDA had expressly
4 told the Company in the January 2019 MPPRC Meeting and in its December 16, 2019
5 correspondence to the Company must be included in a complete application, including “CCR5
6 receptor occupancy data” for three separate doses sizes. The Company had only representative
7 data for two sizes;

8 (f) The Company (and HIV BLA) lacked data that the FDA had expressly
9 told the Company must be included in a complete application, including “a Pop PK analysis to
10 support the selection of a higher dose [700 mg, based on the dose-finding study in the
11 monotherapy study (CD03)] than the dose evaluated in the pivotal trial (CD02)”;

12 (g) The Company (and HIV BLA) lacked data that the FDA had expressly
13 told the Company in its January 22, 2019 correspondence must be included in a complete
14 application, including “analyses of Anti-Drug Antibodies (ADA) or any assessment of any
15 association between ADA and virologic failure”;

16 (h) The Company (and HIV BLA) lacked data that the FDA had expressly
17 told the Company in its November 11, 2019 correspondence must be included in a complete
18 application, including “an integrated assessment of efficacy,” and adequate efficacy comparisons
19 as between the dose group and randomized arms of the study; and

20 (i) The Company (and HIV BLA) lacked data that the FDA had expressly
21 told the Company in its December 16, 2019 correspondence must be included in a complete
22 application, including: (i) “the information and analyses needed to permit FDA reviewers
23 (clinical, statistical, clinical virology and clinical pharmacology) to perform a substantive
24 review of the proposed dose”; (ii) “an integrated assessment that incorporates detailed
25 summaries reflecting data from the participants randomized to receive 350 mg, 525mg, and
26 700mg in CD03 and for the 350 mg dose evaluated in HTE MDR patients in CD02”; and (iii)
27 “multiple reports that are needed to permit a substantive review.”
28

188. By speaking publicly about the Company's purported complete HIV BLA submission and datasets and/or information that the FDA requested, Defendants had a duty to fully, completely, and truthfully disclose all material facts regarding the HIV BLA submission and there was no reasonable basis to misrepresent that the HIV BLA submission was properly filed or that the Company submitted the datasets and/or information that the FDA actually requested.

B. COVID-19

1. Statements Regarding Efficacy and Safety of Leronlimab

189. On May 1, 2020, Defendant Pourhassan and Dr. Patterson participated in Wall Street Reporter's Next Super Stock livestream. It was during that May 1, 2020 livestream, Dr. Patterson reported:

And then to be able to publish with statistical significance the findings encoded that underlie why Leronlimab will work before the statistical significance comes from the trials is -- is a source of great excitement because there's two levels of clinical significance. Obviously, we have to let the FDA do their thing. We are absolutely on board with that and doing it the right way with the FDA. But at the end of the day, we—we're looking at the data on how the drug works on COVID and saying, hey, the drug is doing what it's supposed to be doing and that's statistically significant. So we--we have great, great confidence that because it's been embedded into the trial design that we're going to have a positive outcome, at least in my opinion.

190. On June 2, 2020, Defendant Pourhassan and Dr. Lalezari participated in Wall Street Reporter's Next Super Stock livestream. It was during this June 2, 2020 livestream that Defendant Pourhassan reported: "[a]s we said, you know, the unblinding we will have for CD10, very much likely on June 15th, and of the June, the primary endpoint will be read out to the world, and we hope to shock the world with the very beautiful results."

191. During that same livestream on June 2, 2020, in response to a question from an audience member about where leronlimab would rank "in comparison to all time successful drugs[.]" Dr. Lalezari reported:

"I'm not sure I want to speculate too much on the future, but I -- I will say that if we look at the rest of the COVID-19 landscape, there's no other drug that is showing this kind of antiviral effect. [...] So, yes, it is utterly amazing how well and that effect is being seen in 100 percent of patients. So, you know, I don't—I'm wary of the future [...] As I said, there's no precedent for this, that a new

1 drug—you would know a drug would work from emergency IND data before you
 2 even understood how it was working or even before you had randomized clinical
 3 studies. So I think Nader is doing a great job to try and match reality with
 4 leronlimab, with what is happening. But the—certainly the potential is that this is
 5 ground breaking and the world has never seen anything like it, and in my heart of
 6 hearts, I think this drug’s a home run. And in my heart of hearts, I wish we’d had
 it approved six weeks ago and maybe could have saved the first hundred thousand
 lives, but yes, this story is going to have a huge impact. And my biggest concern
 would be making sure there’s enough drugs to treat everybody in the world who’s
 going to need it. That’s at the end of the day. That’s going to be the biggest
 challenge.”

7 192. On the June 2, 2020 livestream, responding to a question as to what data existed
 8 to show that “patients improved as a result of leronlimab and not just a spontaneous resolution of
 9 the virus[,]” Dr. Lalezari commented: “[t]he results are even more astonishing because as a
 10 group, these patients were so ill and so terminal. But it doesn’t seem to me to be a huge stretch
 11 to take the data in patients who are terminal and then see in the [e]IND results evidence of the
 12 same clinical benefit.”

13 193. The statements above in ¶¶189-192 were false and misleading, omitted material
 14 facts because Defendants knew or were deliberately reckless in not knowing that the FDA had
 15 not determined that leronlimab was safe or efficacious in any indication, including HIV, cancer,
 16 and COVID-19 and that, per the FDA, “the data currently available do not support the clinical
 17 benefit of leronlimab for the treatment of COVID-19.”

18 **2. Statements Regarding The Phase 2 Trial (CD10) Results**

19 194. On August 12, 2020, the Company held a conference call. It was during this call
 20 that Defendant Pourhassan reported:

21 In regards to our study, many questions have come. Did we meet our primary
 22 endpoint? Meeting your primary endpoint — that means you have to have a
 23 clinically significant value, and if it’s the value is much better in the drug versus
 24 placebo, then that becomes a statistically significant. If it’s not statistically
 significant, but clinically significant, then your Phase 3 will do the same thing as
 Phase 2, but with a higher number of patients.

25 So, we had that situation. We had the primary endpoint in regards to clinical
 significance.

26 ***

27 But, something happened to these trials. Something fantastic we have discovered.
 28 We discovered that there is a secondary endpoint that we believe is even more

1 important than our primary endpoint, and we have achieved a statistically
 2 significant value for that, which is the so-called NEWS2. NEWS2, which is the
 3 updated version of NEWS. N-E-W-S, which is National Early Warning Score.
 4 NEWS2 assess the degree of illness that points out to any need for critical care
 intervention. This means we lowered this risk of having this combination of seven
 parameters that constitute the NEWS score, and we have done it by [1]50% better
 than placebo.

5 ***

6 And these seven parameters are very important parameters. Just look at them.
 7 Their respiratory rate, oxygen saturation, supplemental oxygen, temperature,
 8 systolic blood pressure, heart rate, and level of consciousness. So, these are very
 9 important parameters that are used to give you a score. Our score was 50% in
 leronlimab versus 20% in placebo. That was statistically significant. That means
 the risk of critical-care intervention due to use of leronlimab was reduced by two-
 and-half times. And our safety has been very amazing.

10 195. During the same conference call, Defendant Kelly reported: “We just showed
 11 statistical significance in a randomized, double-blinded, placebo-controlled study from a tool that
 12 helps identify which patients will deteriorate and require prompt critical care intervention
 13 [NEWS2]. I think that’s remarkable.”

14 196. In addition, in response to the following question, Defendant Kelly stated: “I . . .
 15 read the statistical significance on Day 3, in terms of the clinical response. But at Day 10 and 14,
 16 there was no difference between the drug and placebo, or there was a difference, but it did not
 17 reach statistical significance?”

18 197. Defendant Pourhassan also stated: “So day seven and fourteen for symptom score
 19 in the pre-protocol, it was not significant. So we didn’t even talk about it. We only talk about the
 20 one that had clinical significance – three days, which we thought it was the most important part.”

21 198. On August 17, 2020, the Company issued a press release entitled *CytoDyn*
 22 *Submits its Top-Line Report from its Phase 2 COVID-19 Trial to the U.S. FDA and Requests*
 23 *Emergency Use Approval*. It was in that press release that Defendant Pourhassan stated:

24 We believe the statistically significant data of NEWS2 findings, along with
 25 impressive safety results (less SAEs or AEs with leronlimab vs. placebo), from
 26 our Phase 2 trial set forth in the Top-line Report provides compelling data in
 27 support of leronlimab’s use to fight COVID-19. We are in discussions with
 28 several regulatory agencies in other countries and hope to obtain emergency
 approval for its use.

1 199. On August 19, 2020, the Company issued a press release entitled *CytoDyn*
 2 *Requests 'Fast Track Approval' for COVID-19 Patients from U.K.'s Regulatory Agency MHRA*
 3 *based on its Top-line Report Showing Statistically Significant Endpoint, NEWS2 (p <0.023) and*
 4 *Notably Safety Results*. It was in that press release that Defendant Pourhassan again touted the
 5 Phase 2 Trial (CD10) “statistically significant efficacy findings.”

6 200. On August 20, 2020, the Company issued a press release entitled *After Several*
 7 *Months of Providing Requested Information About Manufacturing and Safety of Leronlimab,*
 8 *U.K.'s MHRA Accepts CytoDyn's Request to Enroll in its Current Phase 3 Trial for COVID-19*
 9 *Patients with Severe-to-Critical Symptoms*. It was in that press release that Defendant
 10 Pourhassan likewise touted the Phase 2 Trial (CD10) as having “strong efficacy and safety data.”

11 201. The statements in ¶¶194-200 were materially false and misleading because
 12 Defendants knew or were deliberately reckless in not knowing that the FDA had not determined
 13 that leronlimab was safe or efficacious in any indication, including HIV, cancer, and COVID-19.
 14 The statements asserting that the Phase 2 Trial (CD10) had showed “clinical significance” with
 15 respect to its primary endpoint and “statistically significant” with respect to the NEWS2
 16 secondary endpoint and otherwise provided “compelling data” for leronlimab’s use to treat
 17 COVID-19 were false and misleading because Defendants knew or were deliberately reckless in
 18 not knowing that, per the FDA: (a) “the data currently available,” including Phase 2 Trial
 19 (CD10), “do not support the clinical benefit of leronlimab for the treatment of COVID-19”; (b)
 20 “there was no observed effect of the drug on the study’s primary endpoint or on any of the
 21 secondary endpoints”; (c) “[t]he [Phase 2] CD10 trial results showed no clinically meaningful
 22 differences in average change in ‘total clinical symptom score’ from baseline to Day 14 between
 23 study arms”; (d) “none of the secondary endpoints were met in this study, including mortality,
 24 time to symptom resolution, and time to return to normal activity”; and (e) “the [Phase 2] CD10
 25 results indicate that most study participants experienced resolution in COVID-19 symptoms
 26 regardless of whether they received leronlimab or placebo.”
 27
 28

202. On March 5, 2021, the Company issued a press release entitled, *CytoDyn's Phase 3 Trial Demonstrates Safety, a 24% Reduction in Mortality and Faster Hospital Discharge for Mechanically Ventilated Critically Ill COVID-19 Patients Treated with Leronlimab* ("March 5, 2021 Press Release"). In the March 5, 2021 Press Release, the Company disclosed that the Phase 2b/3 Trial (CD12) "demonstrated continued safety, substantial improvement in the survival rate, and faster hospital discharge in critically ill COVID-19 patients."

203. The March 5, 2021 Press Release also stated that: (a) "[t]here was a 24% reduction in all-cause mortality (primary endpoint of the study) in the leronlimab versus placebo"; (b) "[t]he average length of hospital stay was reduced by 6 days for patients who received leronlimab with 'commonly used COVID-19 treatments,' also referred to as 'Standard of Care' or 'SoC,' compared to placebo patients who received SoC only, with a statistically significant p-value of 0.005"; and (c) "patients who received leronlimab demonstrated an improved probability of 'discharged alive' at Day 28 (28% versus 11%), a 166% better rate than the placebo group."

204. Defendant Pourhassan stated in the March 5, 2021 Press Release:

Our [Phase 2b/3] CD12 study demonstrates leronlimab is particularly effective in treating [critically ill COVID-19 patients]. We believe these results are the best results ever achieved for this population in a Phase 3 clinical trial [. . .] leronlimab demonstrated a reduction of 24% in mortality compared to the SoC treated group, which is 12 times better in reducing all-cause mortality for critically ill COVID-19 patients. The Company is very excited about these results and is concurrently working with regulators here and abroad to expedite leronlimab's approval to treat COVID-19.

205. On March 6, 2021, the Company issued a press release entitled, *CytoDyn to File Accelerated Rolling Review with MHRA and Interim Order (IO) with Health Canada for COVID-19* ("March 6, 2021 Press Release") "announc[ing] . . . multiple regulatory pathways for approval of leronlimab as a treatment for critical COVID-19 patients in the U.S. It was in this March 6, 2021 Press Release that the Company stated that it was "pleased to show strong data for critically ill COVID-19 patients."

206. The March 6, 2021 Press Release also reported:

1 [A]n “age adjustment” analysis was performed and consequently, the updated
2 results from the primary endpoint analysis are as follows:

3 1) Statistically significant results (p-value = 0.0319) reported for the primary
4 endpoint (all-cause mortality at Day 28) in participants receiving leronlimab +
5 “commonly used COVID-19 treatments” compared to participants who received
6 “commonly used COVID-19 treatments” alone in the placebo group in the overall
7 modified intent-to-treat (“mITT”) population.

8 2) Statistically significant results (p-value = 0.0552) reported for the primary
9 endpoint (all-cause mortality at Day 28) among participants who received
10 dexamethasone as the prior or concomitant standard of care treatment (“SoC”) for
11 COVID-19, compared to patients who received dexamethasone (without
12 leronlimab) as SoC therapy in the overall mITT population.

13 3) Amongst all patients in mITT, the primary endpoint (all-cause mortality at
14 Day 28) was not statistically significant. When age adjustment was conducted, the
15 primary endpoint was much closer to statistically significant value. Of note, the
16 reduction of mortality in this population of 65 years and younger leronlimab arm
17 had more than 30% less mortality than placebo and 9% less mortality in
18 participants over 65.

19 With the age adjustment analysis in all other major secondary endpoints, there
20 was consistent numerical superiority over the placebo group, with some
21 secondary endpoints approaching statistical significance.

22 207. The Company reissued the March 5, 2021 Press Release and the March 6, 2021
23 Press Release on March 8, 2021.

24 208. Further, on March 8, 2021, the Company issued a press release entitled, *CytoDyn*
25 *to Release CD12 Trial Detailed Results via Form 8-K After Investment Community Webcast,*
26 *Monday, March 8* (“March 8, 2021 Press Release”). The March 8, 2021 Press Release included
27 the statements set forth above.

28 209. The statements in ¶¶202-208 were false and misleading because Defendants knew
or were deliberately reckless in not knowing that the FDA had not determined that leronlimab
was safe or efficacious in any indication, including HIV, cancer, and COVID-19.

210. Defendants’ statements asserting the Phase 2b/3 Trial (CD12) “show[s] strong
data” and “demonstrates” that leronlimab is “particularly effective in treating critically-ill”
COVID-19 patients, and that Defendants had “multiple regulatory pathways for approval of
leronlimab as a treatment for critical COVID-19 patients in the U.S.” and were using the Phase
2b/3 Trial (CD12) to “expedite leronlimab approval” were false and misleading because

Defendants knew or were deliberately reckless in not knowing that per the FDA: (a) the Phase 2b/3 Trial (CD12) “failed to find any effect of the drug on the primary study endpoint, with no difference seen in mortality (20.5% in the leronlimab treatment group and 21.6% in the placebo treatment group); or on any of the secondary endpoints, for example, with no difference on the average length of hospitalization (21.4 days in both the leronlimab and the placebo treatment groups)”; (b) the Phase 2b/3 Trial (CD12) subgroup analyses “do not support reliable conclusions about the medicine’s benefit” where, as here, “the analyses of the primary and secondary endpoints do not support conclusions of the medicine’s benefit”; (c) “[s]ubgroup analyses have well-established limitations, especially in the context of a clinical trial [such as this one] that has failed to show a benefit in the overall study population”; (d) “[f]ocusing on only the most favorable of many subgroup analyses, even if the sub-groups are pre-specified, can lead to overestimating the evidence of benefit, because regardless of a drug’s true efficacy, some analyses are likely to appear favorable by chance when a large number of analyses are conducted”; and (e) “[n]one of th[e subgroup] analyses” for Phase 2b/3 Trial (CD12) “met statistical significance when using established and reliable analytical methods that correct for multiple comparisons.”

211. In addition, Defendants’ statements that Phase 2b/3 Trial (CD12) “demonstrated . . . substantial improvement in the survival rate” of critically ill patients and a “24% reduction in all-cause mortality rate (the primary endpoint of the study)” in critically ill patients, and the “age adjusted analysis” and “updated results from the primary endpoint analysis” for three different subgroups were materially false and misleading, omitted material facts, and lacked a reasonable basis when made because Defendants knew but did not disclose that the Phase 2b/3 Trial (CD12) “failed to find any effect of the drug on the primary study endpoint,” and also per the FDA: (a) the analysis of “subgroup[s]”—here, critically-ill patients, patients taking leronlimab + standard of care, all mITT9 patients, and mITT patients taking leronlimab + dexamethasone—“do not support reliable conclusions about the medicine’s benefit” where, as here, “the analys[i]s of the primary . . . endpoint[] do[es] not support

1 conclusions of the medicine’s benefit”; and (b) “[n]one of th[e subgroup] analyses” for Phase
2 2b/3 Trial (CD12) “met statistical significance when using established and reliable analytical
3 methods that correct for multiple comparisons.”

4 212. Moreover, the statements that the Phase 2b/3 Trial “demonstrated an improved
5 probability of ‘discharged alive’ at Day 28” and a “statistically significant” reduction in the
6 “average length of hospital stay . . . by 6 days” in the subgroup of patients that took leronlimab +
7 the standard of care were false and misleading because Defendants knew but did not disclose that
8 the Phase 2b/3 Trial (CD12) “failed to find any effect of the drug . . . on any of the secondary
9 “mITT” refers Modified Intention-to-Treat. The “Intention-to-Treat” principle requires that all
10 participants in a randomized study be included in the final analysis and analyzed according to
11 their assigned treatment group regardless of what happened during the patient’s participation in
12 the study. There is no clear definition of “mITT” as it can vary from trial to trial, but effectively,
13 mITT indicates that some participants were excluded when the results were unblinded
14 endpoints,” and per the FDA: (a) the Phase 2b/3 Trial (CD12) subgroup analyses “do not support
15 reliable conclusions about the medicine’s benefit” where, as here, “the analys[i]s of the . . .
16 secondary endpoints do not support conclusions of the medicine’s benefit”; (b) “[s]ubgroup
17 analyses have well-established limitations, especially in the context of a clinical trial [such as
18 this one] that has failed to show a benefit in the overall study population”; and (iii) “[n]one of
19 th[e subgroup] analyses” for Phase 2b/3 Trial (CD12) “met statistical significance when using
20 established and reliable analytical methods that correct for multiple comparisons.”

21 213. In addition, on March 8, 2021, a conference call was held. During the call,
22 Defendant Pourhassan stated that CD12 “showed [a] statistically significant secondary
23 endpoint.”

24 214. Moreover, at this conference call, Chief Scientific Officer Mahboob Rahman
25 (“Rahman”) stated: “if you look at the data . . . even in the overall population, you will see
26 consistently in essentially all different endpoints, you see a benefit, maybe numerical, but you
27 see a benefit consistently.” Rahman also stated:
28

1 we . . . prespecified the critically ill patients as one of the subpopulations that we
2 will test our primary and secondary endpoint. And if you look at those
3 prespecified analysis, you will see that this – the mortality was reduced by 24% in
4 this critically ill patient population, which was defined as ordinal scale 2, which
5 means intubated – either just intubated or on ECMO. These patients, 24%
6 mortality was reduced.

7 Then if you look at the time to recovery or discharge from hospitals, our hospital
8 stay in this patient population, you actually see a statistically significant
9 difference, 6 days less in this patient population. And another secondary endpoint,
10 which is called discharge alive through day 28, and in here, we see a pretty wide
11 difference between the patient who received leronlimab, 28%, versus patients who
12 only received standard of care, 11%, a 166% better rate than placebo.

13 So with these results in this critically ill patient population, we think that
14 regulatory authorities will take a very close look and see if there is a potential for
15 saving lives under the conditions that we are in right now, with essentially no
16 medication having an impact in the mortality and benefit in the critically ill
17 population.

18 215. Also, during this conference call, Defendant Pourhassan reported:

19 Critically ill population, we've shown relative reduction in mortality of 24%. In
20 regard to the whole population, we talk about 309 patients severe and critical.
21 What happened when they took were commonly used drugs and leronlimab
22 versus placebo, and we talk about 233 patients that took dexamethasone with
23 leronlimab versus dexamethasone and placebo.

24 216. Defendant Pourhassan and Rahman had the following response to questions posed
25 by Arian Colachis ("Colachis"), the Company's Vice President ("VP"), General Counsel and
26 Secretary:

27 COLACHIS: . . . ClinicalTrials.gov named all-cause mortality as the primary
28 endpoint. Why report the 24% reduction in all-cause mortality without a p-value?

POURHASSAN: We discussed that. We put the p-value for primary endpoint.
Critical yield was another primary endpoint.

COLACHIS: The press release does not support a p-value for shortened time to
recovery but nowhere is shortened time to recovery listed as an endpoint at
ClinicalTrials.gov. Do you want a future trial protocol to include this as an
endpoint?

RAHMAN: Maybe in the ClinicalTrials.gov, it is listed as hospital stay – length
of hospital stay, which is the same as essentially shortened time to recovery. We
just made it more understandable in terms of lingo but it's the same. And that is
one of the secondary endpoint, and that is the one that was statistically significant
in the critically ill population.

217. In response to the following question posed by Colachis: “What is the difference between overall mortality and probability of being discharged alive?”, Defendant Pourhassan and Rahman stated:

POURHASSAN: So discharged alive was ordinal scale of 2. Everybody was scored between 1 to 7, 1 being dead to being on invasive mechanical ventilator, intubated in ICU. And 7 was released from hospital with no problem. 6 was released from hospital with some minor problems. So those patients who walk out with OS 2 and they received a score of 6 to 7, and that’s what we evaluated at the time of discharge because 6 and 7 means discharged.

RAHMAN: So to explain it simply, overall mortality is patients who died. And discharged alive not only takes into account whether you’re alive but also takes into account that you are well enough to leave the hospital. So it’s a combination of being alive and well enough to leave the hospital. So you may be alive, but you’re not in a condition to leave the hospital by day 28 because that’s also a benefit. And as I said before, in this endpoint, you see that the patients who received leronlimab, 28% of them were able to leave the hospital by day 28, whereas only 11% of the standard of care. So--so yes, so it takes into account death as well as how well you are feeling if you’re alive.

218. On March 8, 2021, the Company filed with the SEC a Form 8-K (the “EXECUTIVE SUMMARY CD12_COVID-19 STUDY 04-MAR-2021”) (“March 8, 2021 Form 8-K”).

219. With respect to the Phase 2b/3 Trial (CD12) results, the March 8, 2021 Form 8-K stated:

Survival benefit: A favorable, statistically significant results (p value 0.0319) reported for the primary endpoint (all-cause mortality at Day 28) in participants receiving leronlimab + “commonly used COVID-19 treatments” compared to participants who received “commonly used COVID-19 treatments” alone in the placebo group in the overall mITT population.

Similar statistically significant results (p value 0.0552) reported for the primary endpoint (all-cause mortality at Day 28) among participants who received dexamethasone as the prior or concomitant standard of care treatment for COVID-19, compared to patients who received dexamethasone (without leronlimab) as standard of care therapy in the overall mITT population.

Shortened time to recovery: The average length of hospital stay was lower in leronlimab group compared to placebo/SoC group in the critically ill population with a statistically significant p value of 0.0050 using the Rank-ANCOVA model.

1 Leronlimab improved the probability of “discharged alive” at Day 28 in the
2 overall mITT population as well as in the critically ill population with the results
trending towards statistical significance.

3 220. The March 8, 2021 Form 8-K also reported: “The safety analysis of leronlimab in
4 COVID-19 patients was found consistent with the established extensive safety profile with over
5 1000 patients treated across other multiple studies and indications.”

6 221. The March 8, 2021 Form 8-K also reported: “The potential benefit of adding
7 leronlimab to SoC was consistently seen in the critically ill patient population by virtue of
8 numerically better results for all pre specified evaluated clinical endpoints.”

9 222. The statements in ¶¶213-221 were false and misleading because Defendants knew
10 or were deliberately reckless in not knowing that the FDA had not determined that leronlimab
11 was safe or efficacious in any indication, including HIV, cancer, and COVID-19. Defendants’
12 statements that leronlimab’s “safety profile” was “established,” the Phase 2b/3 Trial (CD12)
13 “consistently” showed “a benefit” “in essentially all endpoints” “even in the overall population”
14 as well as in “critically ill patient[s]” taking leronlimab with “SoC” “for all pre-specified
15 evaluated clinical endpoints” were false and misleading because Defendants knew or were
16 deliberately reckless in not knowing that per the FDA: (a) the Phase 2b/3 Trial (CD12) “failed to
17 find any effect of the drug on the primary study endpoint, with no difference seen in mortality
18 (20.5% in the leronlimab treatment group and 21.6% in the placebo treatment group); or on any
19 of the secondary endpoints, for example, with no difference on the average length of
20 hospitalization (21.4 days in both the leronlimab and the placebo treatment groups)”; (b) the
21 Phase 2b/3 Trial (CD12) subgroup analyses “do not support reliable conclusions about the
22 medicine’s benefit” where, as here, “the analyses of the primary and second endpoints do not
23 support conclusions of the medicine’s benefit”; (c) “[s]ubgroup analyses have well-established
24 limitations, especially in the context of a clinical trial [such as this one] that has failed to show a
25 benefit in the overall study population”; (d) “[f]ocusing on only the most favorable of many
26 subgroup analyses, even if the sub-groups are pre-specified, can lead to overestimating the
27 evidence of benefit, because regardless of a drug’s true efficacy, some analyses are likely to
28

1 appear favorable by chance when a large number of analyses are conducted”; and (e) “[n]one of
 2 th[e subgroup] analyses” for Phase 2b/3 Trial (CD12) “met statistical significance when using
 3 established and reliable analytical methods that correct for multiple comparisons.”

4 223. Defendants’ statements that Phase 2b/3 Trial (CD12) also demonstrated a
 5 “[s]urvival benefit” including “favorable, statistically significant results . . . reported for the
 6 primary endpoint” in two subgroups (leronlimab + SoC and leronlimab + dexamethasone) and a
 7 “relative reduction in mortality of 24%” in a “pre-specified” critically ill patient subgroup were
 8 false and misleading because Defendants knew or were deliberately reckless in not knowing that
 9 also per the FDA: (a) the Phase 2b/3 Trial (CD12) “failed to find any effect of the drug on the
 10 primary study endpoint,” and, per the FDA; (b) the analysis of “subgroup[s]”—here, critically-ill
 11 patients, patients taking leronlimab + SoC, all mITT patients, and mITT patients taking
 12 leronlimab + dexamethasone—“do not support reliable conclusions about the medicine’s
 13 benefit” where, as here, “the analys[i]s of the primary . . . endpoint[] do[es] not support
 14 conclusions of the medicine’s benefit”; and (c) “[n]one of th[e subgroup] analyses” for Phase
 15 2b/3 Trial (CD12) “met statistical significance when using established and reliable analytical
 16 methods that correct for multiple comparisons.”

17 224. Defendants’ statements that the Phase 2b/3 Trial also demonstrated “shortened
 18 time” for recovery, including a “statistically significant” reduction in “average length of hospital
 19 stay” in critically ill patient subgroup, “[l]eronlimab improved the probability of ‘discharged
 20 alive’” in two subgroups (overall mITT population and critically ill patients), and CD12 “showed
 21 a statistically significant endpoint” were false and misleading because Defendants knew or were
 22 deliberately reckless in not knowing that per the FDA: (a) the Phase 2b/3 Trial (CD12) “failed to
 23 find any effect of the drug . . . on any of the secondary endpoints”; (b) the Phase 2b/3 Trial
 24 (CD12) subgroup analyses “do not support reliable conclusions about the medicine’s benefit”
 25 where, as here, “the analys[i]s of the . . . secondary endpoints do not support conclusions of the
 26 medicine’s benefit”; (c) “[s]ubgroup analyses have well-established limitations, especially in the
 27 context of a clinical trial [such as this one] that has failed to show a benefit in the overall study
 28

population”; and (d) “[n]one of th[e subgroup] analyses” for Phase 2b/3 Trial (CD12) “met statistical significance when using established and reliable analytical methods that correct for multiple comparisons.”

225. On March 30, 2021, the Company issued a press release entitled *CytoDyn’s Leronlimab Decreased Mortality at 14 Days by 82% With Statistically Significant P-Value of 0.0233 Amongst Critically Ill COVID-19 Patients*. The press release reported:

Upon further statistical analysis of the critically ill population (hospitalized patients receiving invasive mechanical ventilation (IMV) or ECMO), it was revealed that when leronlimab was added to standard of care (“SoC”), leronlimab decreased mortality at 14 days by 82% ($p=.0233$, $N=62$). Patients who received leronlimab were over five times more likely to be alive at day 14 than those who received SoC only.

Furthermore, leronlimab administration was associated with a 400% improvement in the ranking on the 7-point ordinal scale at 14 days when given in conjunction with SoC ($p=.021$, $N=62$) in the critically ill population, which provides direct evidence of tangible patient improvement.

226. The March 30, 2021 press release also provided:

This analysis builds upon the previously released information from the Company’s mITT analysis of CD12 showing:

- A clear benefit when leronlimab was used in addition to “commonly used COVID-19 treatments,” in the primary endpoint of all-cause mortality at day 28 with an absolute risk reduction of death of 6.5% and a relative risk reduction of death of 28.1% ($N=309$, $p=.0319$).
- A clear benefit when leronlimab was used in combination with dexamethasone, in the primary endpoint of all-cause mortality at day 28 with an absolute risk reduction of death of 5.7% and a relative risk reduction of 26.0% ($N=233$, $p=.0552$).
- Length in hospital stay decreased by 5.5 days in the critically ill population ($N=62$, $p=.005$).
- A clear trend toward mortality benefit at day 28 with an absolute risk reduction of death of 20.9% and a relative risk reduction of death of 73% when leronlimab was used in addition to “commonly used COVID-19 treatments” in the critically ill population with an age ≤ 65 years old.
- A clear trend toward mortality benefit at day 28 with an absolute risk reduction of death of 16.3% and a relative risk reduction of death of 73.5% when leronlimab was used in addition to dexamethasone in the critically ill population ≤ 65 years old.

1 227. The March 30, 2021 press release also quoted Defendant Pourhassan: “The
2 Company believes this new information bolsters the case for immediate use of leronlimab for
3 critically ill patients. Furthermore, we believe these results suggest that to see maximum effect
4 of leronlimab at day 28, we must use three to four doses of leronlimab and not just two doses, as
5 was the case with CD12 (day zero and day 7 only).”

6 228. The statements set forth above in ¶¶225-227 were false and misleading because
7 Defendants knew or were deliberately reckless in not knowing that the FDA had not determined
8 that leronlimab was safe or efficacious in any indication, including HIV, cancer, and COVID-19.
9 The statements that (a) “further statistical analysis” of the critically ill subgroup demonstrated a
10 statistically significant reduction of mortality at 14 days and “direct evidence of tangible patient
11 improvement” on the ordinal scale, (b) the new “analysis” showed a “clear” mortality “benefit”
12 or a “clear trend toward [a] mortality benefit” in various subgroups, and (c) the purportedly “new
13 information” in the March 30, 2021 Press Release “bolster[ed] the case for immediate use of
14 leronlimab for critically ill patients” were false and misleading because Defendants knew or
15 were deliberately reckless in not knowing that per the FDA: (i) the Phase 2b/3 Trial (CD12)
16 “failed to find any effect of the drug on the primary study endpoint, with no difference seen in
17 mortality (20.5% in the leronlimab treatment group and 21.6% in the placebo treatment group);
18 or on any of the secondary endpoints, for example, with no difference on the average length of
19 hospitalization (21.4 days in both the leronlimab and the placebo treatment groups)”; (ii) the
20 Phase 2b/3 Trial (CD12) subgroup analyses “do not support reliable conclusions about the
21 medicine’s benefit” where, as here, “the analyses of the primary and secondary endpoints do not
22 support conclusions of the medicine’s benefit”; (iii) “[s]ubgroup analyses have well- established
23 limitations, especially in the context of a clinical trial [such as this one] that has failed to show a
24 benefit in the overall study population”; (iv) “[f]ocusing on only the most favorable of many
25 subgroup analyses, even if the sub-groups are pre-specified, can lead to overestimating the
26 evidence of benefit, because regardless of a drug’s true efficacy, some analyses are likely to
27 appear favorable by chance when a large number of analyses are conducted”; and (v) “[n]one of
28

th[e subgroup] analyses” for Phase 2b/3 Trial (CD12) “met statistical significance when using established and reliable analytical methods that correct for multiple comparisons.”

VII. DAMAGES TO THE COMPANY

229. As a direct and proximate result of the Individual Defendants’ conduct, CytoDyn has been seriously harmed and will continue to be. Such harm includes, but is not limited to:

- (a) Any funds paid to settle the Securities Class Action;
- (b) Costs, including expenses, professional fees, and penalties, incurred in connection with the SEC and DOJ investigations;
- (c) Ill-gotten gains from Defendants’ insider stock sales; and
- (d) Costs incurred from compensation and benefits paid to the defendants who have breached their duties to CytoDyn.

230. In addition, CytoDyn’s business, goodwill, and reputation with its business partners, regulators, and shareholders have been gravely impaired. The Company still has not fully admitted the nature of its false statements and the true condition of its business. The credibility and motives of management are now in serious doubt.

231. The actions complained of herein have irreparably damaged CytoDyn’s corporate image and goodwill. For at least the foreseeable future, CytoDyn will suffer from what is known as the “liar’s discount,” a term applied to the stocks of companies who have been implicated in illegal behavior and have misled the investing public, such that CytoDyn’s ability to raise equity capital or debt on favorable terms in the future is now impaired.

VIII. DERIVATIVE AND DEMAND FUTILITY ALLEGATIONS

232. Plaintiffs bring this action derivatively in the right and for the benefit of CytoDyn to redress injuries suffered, and to be suffered, by CytoDyn as a direct result of breaches of fiduciary duty by the Individual Defendants and contribution for violations of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act. CytoDyn is named as a nominal defendant solely in a derivative capacity. This is not a collusive action to confer jurisdiction on this Court that it would not otherwise have.

233. Plaintiffs will adequately and fairly represent the interests of CytoDyn in enforcing and prosecuting its rights.

234. Plaintiffs have continuously been shareholders of CytoDyn at times relevant to the wrongdoing complained of and are current CytoDyn shareholders.

235. When this action was filed,⁵ CytoDyn's Board of Directors consisted of defendants Kelly, Pourhassan, Naydenov, Timmins, and Patel. Plaintiffs did not make any demand on the Board to institute this action because such a demand would be a futile, wasteful, and useless act, as set forth below.

The Entire Board Faces A Substantial Likelihood Of Liability

236. At all relevant times, CytoDyn has had one product candidate. Leronlimab is the Company's core business, indeed, the Company's only business. Each of Kelly, Pourhassan, Naydenov, Timmins, and Patel had a fiduciary obligation to be informed of material developments regarding leronlimab. In the event that Kelly, Pourhassan, Naydenov, Timmins, and Patel discharged that obligation and were informed, they knew that the Company was pervasively issuing false statements regarding its core business. In the alternative, if Kelly, Pourhassan, Naydenov, Timmins, and Patel were so woefully uninformed regarding the Company's core business as to be unaware that the public disclosures were pervasively false and misleading, they face a substantial likelihood of liability for failing to act in good faith and inform themselves regarding the wrongdoing at the Company. Due to the foregoing, and the allegations herein, demand is excused as to each of Kelly, Pourhassan, Naydenov, Timmins, and Patel.

Pourhassan, Kelly, And Naydenov Face A Substantial Likelihood Of Liability Due To Misleading Statements Issued Regarding the HIV BLA

237. Leronlimab was the Company's sole drug candidate, so the HIV BLA presented the first opportunity for CytoDyn to commercialize leronlimab and generate revenue. Thus, Pourhassan and Kelly (as executive officers) and Naydenov (as a member of the Audit

⁵ The lead case in this consolidated action was filed on June 4, 2021.

1 Committee) knew or were reckless in not knowing that the HIV BLA was deficient when it was
2 filed.

3 238. Specifically, they knew or were reckless in not knowing that the FDA had
4 identified certain data that was required to be included in CytoDyn's HIV BLA based on the
5 following:

6 (a) In a June 2018 pre-BLA meeting, the FDA "requested" that CytoDyn
7 "submit complete bioanalytical reports (reports which describe analysis of concentrations of
8 leronlimab in blood samples collected in the clinical trials)."

9 (b) During a December 14, 2018 teleconference, the FDA "reiterated" that the
10 failure to submit the following information would be considered grounds for a "Refusal to File:"
11 "CMC [Chemistry Manufacturing Controls] information, an agreed upon iPSP and final results
12 from a Human Factors study."

13 (c) Following a January 2019 MPPRC meeting, the Division of Antivirals
14 related that it had "asked about the CCR5 receptor occupancy data for the 350 mg, 525 mg and
15 700 mg doses."

16 (d) Correspondence prior to January 16, 2019 in which the FDA "requested a
17 Pop PK analysis to support the selection of a higher dose [700 mg, based on the dose-finding
18 study in the monotherapy study (CD03)] than the dose evaluated in the pivotal trial (CD02)."
19 (Alteration in original.).

20 (e) Correspondence dated January 22, 2019 identifying that "a detailed
21 narrative to explain whether or not [Anti-Drug Antibodies ("ADA")] is associated with virologic
22 failure" to allay the agency's concerns that ADA "may impact leronlimab effectiveness."

23 (f) Correspondence dated November 11, 2019 "that explain[ed] the
24 importance of displaying CD03 data by randomization group; and

25 (g) December 16, 2019 correspondence stating that CytoDyn "should submit
26 an integrated assessment and detailed summary that supports [its] selected dose [700 mg],"
27 which
28

1 incorporates virologic outcomes, safety data (including laboratory abnormalities),
2 exposure related data (including population pharmacokinetics and exposure-
3 response relationship analyses), receptor occupancy data (including both method
4 validation report and bioanalytical report of clinical samples), and anti-idiotypic
5 data (including both method validation report and bioanalytical report of clinical
6 samples).

7 239. The assessment “should reflect data from the 3 doses evaluated in CD03 and for
8 the 350 mg dose evaluated in HTE MDR patients in CD02.”

9 240. Pourhassan specifically knew that the HIV BLA was incomplete when it was
10 submitted on or about April 27, 2020. On April 14, 2020, Pourhassan emailed Dhody,
11 Kazempour, and Nitya Ray (CytoDyn’s Chief Technology Officer) directing them to “file the
12 BLA no later than next week Wednesday, *even if we are short in no matter what portion of*
13 *whatever it is that we are short.*” His email makes clear that he was motivated to do so because
14 CytoDyn’s stock price continued to decline following repeated delays in the submission, which
15 deteriorated the value of his holdings and the potential value of the options that would only vest
16 when CytoDyn submitted the HIV BLA (*see ¶253, infra*):

17 Dear Nitya and Kush:

18 Today we have so far in 1 hour almost 20% drop in our stock price. Yesterday we
19 had drop also after putting out great results about COVID-19 patients we are
20 seeing these type[s] of decline.

21 This drop will be much deeper if we don’t file our BLA as the message board is
22 now getting bombarded by investors who are very frustrated with me and
23 CytoDyn.

24 Please file the BLA no later than next week Wednesday, *even if we are short in*
25 *no matter what portion of whatever it is that we are short.*

26 241. Despite knowing that the HIV BLA suffered fatal deficiencies when submitted on
27 April 27, 2020, Pourhassan, Kelly, and Naydenov issued or caused CytoDyn to issue misleading
28 statements touting the “complete” submission as a “monumental achievement.” Although the
Company walked back some of these statements over the next few days, the HIV BLA was still
incomplete after CytoDyn submitted certain clinical datasets on May 11, 2020. As alleged
herein, the FDA’s RTF Letter issued on July 8, 2020 identified the deficiencies in the

1 Company's BLA submission, all of which Pourhassan knew CytoDyn was required to submit.
 2 Specifically, the RTF letter confirmed that the HIV BLA did not include:

3 (a) bioanalytical reports describing analysis of concentrations of leronlimab in
 4 blood samples;

5 (b) "data from studies conducted with the drug in the device" and information
 6 "on the manufacturer of the syringe and needles";

7 (c) required receptor occupancy data, instead including "only representative
 8 data from 525 mg and 700 mg in the receptor occupancy report, which itself "does not
 9 adequately address numerous methodologic[al] concerns";

10 (d) Pop PK analysis consistent with the FDA's guidance;

11 (e) "analyses of [ADA] or any assessment of any association between ADA
 12 and virologic failure";

13 (f) "an integrated assessment of efficacy" because, among other things, "the
 14 comparisons of effectiveness by dose . . . were conducted by dose group instead of between the
 15 randomized arms"; and

16 (g) "an integrated assessment that incorporates detailed summaries reflecting
 17 data from the participants randomized to receive 350 mg, 525 mg, and 700 mg in CD03 and for
 18 the 350 mg dose evaluated in HTE MDR patients in CDO2" and other information to enable the
 19 FDA "to perform a substantive review of the proposed dose."

20 242. The substance of the RTF Letter was not public until October 26, 2021, when it
 21 was filed in litigation between Amarex and CytoDyn. Pourhassan, while in possession of the
 22 RTF Letter, downplayed the deficiencies and misleadingly claimed that he "felt the application
 23 was completed for the FDA to provide the PDUFA date." These statements are wholly
 24 implausible, given the significant deficiencies noted in the RTF Letter and the fact that CytoDyn
 25 has yet to obtain the additional clinical data and refile the HIV BLA.⁶

26 _____
 27 ⁶ After repeated delays, CytoDyn now claims it expects to resubmit the clinical section of the
 28 BLA by the end of the first calendar quarter of 2022.

243. For the foregoing reasons, Pourhassan, Kelly, and Naydenov face a substantial likelihood of liability for breach of fiduciary duty, thus they could not disinterestedly consider a demand and demand is futile as to them.

Pourhassan, Kelly, And Naydenov Face A Substantial Likelihood Of Liability In Connection With Misleading Statements Issued Regarding Leronlimab As A Potential Treatment For COVID-19

244. On May 17, 2021, the FDA issued a statement on leronlimab recognizing, in relevant part, that “[w]ith the conclusion of both the CD10 and CD12 clinical trials, it has become clear that the data currently available do not support the clinical benefit of leronlimab for the treatment of COVID-19.” The FDA’s comments plainly contradict the statements that Pourhassan, Kelly, and Naydenov caused CytoDyn to issue touting the purported “statistically significant” results from the CD10 and CD12 trials, as alleged herein. When pressed whether the FDA was merely targeting the Company for “moving outside the U.S. to conduct its trial” by issuing a statement rebuking the Company’s claims, Pourhassan conceded “the FDA has not done anything wrong. We did something wrong.”

Pourhassan, Together With Kelly And Naydenov, Wields Significant Influence Over The Board

245. Pourhassan, together with Kelly and Naydenov, wields significant influence over the Board such that the remaining directors could not independently consider a demand. By late 2019, many of CytoDyn’s directors and officers had been ousted due to their disagreements with Pourhassan, especially related to his executive compensation, and replaced by Pourhassan’s loyalists.

Pourhassan Forces Out Those Who Fail to Acquiesce to His Desires and Actions

246. At the start of CytoDyn’s fiscal 2019 year on June 1, 2018, the Board was comprised of Pourhassan, Kelly, Naydenov, Carl Dockery (“Dockery”), Gregory A. Gould (“Gould”), Denis R. Burger (“Burger”), A. Bruce Montgomery (“Montgomery”), and Anthony Caracciolo (“Caracciolo”). By September 2019, the Board was significantly restructured: Burger,

1 Caracciolo, Montgomery, Dockery, and Gould resigned or were removed, and Michael A.
2 Klump (“Klump”) and David F. Welch (“Welch”) were installed.

3 247. Burger, Caraccoilo, and Montgomery resigned by the end of 2018 after pushing
4 back on Pourhassan’s demands for increased compensation. During his first five years as CEO
5 from 2013 to 2018, Pourhassan received total annual compensation of \$447,552 (of which
6 \$72,659 was stock option awards), \$615,406 (\$96,406 in stock option awards), \$1,323,824
7 (\$696,335), \$1,143,298 (\$456,660), \$966,561 (\$293,201), respectively, which far exceeded the
8 CEO compensation of similarly situated peer companies like Xenetic Biosciences, Inc.
9 (\$318,333 in 2018) and AmpliPhi Biosciences Corporation (\$618,000 in 2018). Nevertheless,
10 “[a]t almost every Board meeting, Pourhassan would begin with a presentation about all the
11 things he was doing for the Company and the financial sacrifices he had purportedly made . . . to
12 complain that he was underpaid and entitled to additional (but undeserved) compensation.”
13 Dockery, Gould, and Caracciolo contend that “Pourhassan made no secret of the fact that he
14 placed his own financial interests above protecting the Company’s work and future.”

15 248. In July 2019, Pourhassan ousted CytoDyn’s then-Chief Medical Officer, Richard
16 Pestell, after Dr. Pestell “raised concerns regarding certain actions taken by the CEO, including
17 but not limited to actions in connection with public representations” and “regulatory
18 submissions.” According to Dr. Pestell’s later lawsuit, his relationship with Pourhassan “rapidly
19 deteriorated following Dr. Pestell’s objections in late June 2019” to an Investigational New Drug
20 Application protocol that CytoDyn planned to submit to the FDA “despite the fact that Dr.
21 Pestell . . . determined that the protocol . . . was not safe for the study subjects.” On July 1, 2019,
22 Pourhassan emailed the Board seeking permission to terminate Dr. Pestell for cause and appoint
23 Kelly as CMO. When this did not come to fruition, Pourhassan proposed (and the Board
24 approved) appointing Kelly as Chief Science Officer and giving him many of Dr. Pestell’s CMO
25 responsibilities. The Company’s proxy statements identify that Kelly is “a practicing physician
26 and writer” with directorships at various medical associations, but he is not qualified by training
27 or experience in biotech companies to warrant the management position. When Dr. Pestell sent a
28

1 letter from his counsel regarding the foregoing, Pourhassan engineered a Board meeting at which
2 Dr. Pestell was terminated for cause.⁷

3 249. Dr. Pestell's exit in turn sparked the removal of Gould and Dockery from
4 CytoDyn's Board. Gould had objected to the proposed termination of Dr. Pestell, so "Kelly
5 intentionally put the matter to a Board vote when he knew Gould would be on an airplane and
6 unavailable . . . after expressly telling Gould that he [Kelly] would not put Pestell's termination
7 to a vote while Gould was not available." Dockery had alerted CytoDyn's auditor and the rest of
8 the Board to Pourhassan's conduct, especially false and misleading statements to investors in
9 December 2018 that CytoDyn would submit the HIV BLA by "the first quarter of 2019" when
10 Pourhassan and others "were informed that Q1 2019 was not a realistic timeframe."⁸ On July 30,
11 2019, the Board voted to remove Dockery and Gould from the slate of directors that would stand
12 for reelection. *See Alpha Venture Capital Partners LP et al. v. Pourhassan et al.*, Case No. 2020-
13 0307 (Del. Ch.), ("*Alpha Venture Complaint*"), at ¶ 81. Gould then resigned in August 2019 and
14 Dockery served on the Board until September 12, 2019, the date of the 2019 Annual Meeting.

15 250. Klump resigned from the Board on January 15, 2020 amid a dispute to award
16 11.65 million stock options to insiders, including Pourhassan, who had already received more
17 than 9 million options in excess of their annual award. *Alpha Venture Complaint*, at ¶¶ 119-120.

18 *Pourhassan, Kelly, and Naydenov Are Forced to Forfeit Substantial Stock Awards*

19 251. Thus, by September 2019, the Board was comprised of Pourhassan, Kelly,
20 Naydenov, Klump, and Welch. The Compensation Committee consisted of Naydenov and
21

22 ⁷ The litigation regarding Dr. Pestell's termination is ongoing. *See Pestell v. CytoDyn Inc. et al.*,
Case No. 19-cv-1563-RTD (D. Del.).

23 ⁸ Dockery also noted that the Board had discussed with Pourhassan that public statements
24 "needed to involve the Board and go through a more rigorous process to ensure their accuracy
25 and tone," at which point Pourhassan "attempted to fire the attorney at Lowenstein Sandler LLP
26 [CytoDyn's outside corporate counsel] that had been attempting to help him with press releases
27 and public statements" but "Pestell and [Dockery] prevented that from happening." After Dr.
Pestell and Dockery were forced out of the Company, Lowenstein Sandler LLP, was either
28 terminated or resigned by January 2020.

1 Welch, but CytoDyn had already identified that Welch was not independent due to his consulting
2 arrangement as “Strategic Advisor” for the Company. His service on the committee violated the
3 Compensation Committee charter, which requires that its members be independent directors.

4 252. On December 19, 2019, Pourhassan, Kelly, Klump, Naydenov, and Welch
5 awarded themselves and four other insiders 9.3 million stock options and warrants. This award
6 was unrelated to the usual course of business because directors had already been awarded their
7 annual grant – non-employee directors received 100,000 stock options in June 2019 with an
8 exercise price of \$0.52 per share, the closing price of the Company’s stock on the date of the
9 grant; Pourhassan received 375,000 stock options under the Incentive Plan in October 2019; and
10 Kelly and Welch each received 187,500 stock options in October 2019. Moreover, the December
11 2019 Awards were the “result of a hastily called night-time meeting Pourhassan initiated and
12 which resulted in the immediate granting of an out-of-schedule award.” *Alpha Venture*
13 *Complaint*, ¶ 117.

14 253. Pourhassan was the beneficiary of a substantial part of the December 2019 award.
15 He received 4 million stock options/warrants; Kelly received 1.25 million; Klump, Naydenov,
16 and Welch each received 750,000; and Mulholland received 700,000. Approximately half of the
17 awards to Pourhassan, Kelly, and Mulholland vested immediately, while the remainder would
18 vest “on the date on which [CytoDyn] files its BLA for HIV combination therapy with the
19 FDA.”

20 254. The December 2019 awards were an egregious act of self-dealing to profit from
21 material non-public information. Not only were these the largest awards these insiders had ever
22 received, they were publicly rationalized as necessary to “align . . . with industry standards” and
23 were “consistent with the Company’s desire to provide compensation in line with its competitors,
24 but the Board had never analyzed or considered the “industry standards” when it approved the
25 awards. *Alpha Venture Complaint*, ¶¶ 107-110. Rather, they were “spring-loaded” awards
26 granted just prior to the release of positive financial information – on December 23, 2019 (two
27 business days following the grant), CytoDyn announced “continued promising clinical responses
28

1 from its metastatic triple-negative breast (mTNBC) Phase 1b/2 trial,” causing the stock price to
2 soar by 55% to \$0.98 per share on December 27, 2019. Thus, within a matter of days of the
3 grant, the December 2019 awards were in-the-money by \$0.35 per share, or \$3,255,000 in the
4 aggregate.

5 255. After Klump resigned, on January 18, 2020, Pourhassan, Kelly, Naydenov, and
6 Welch awarded themselves another 11.5 million shares in equity awards. The awards have no
7 exercise price or trading restrictions, but using the \$1.05 closing price on the date of the grant,
8 the equity awards were valued at approximately \$12 million.

9 256. The December 2019 and January 2020 equity awards prompted derivative
10 litigation brought by six shareholders, including Gould and entities managed by Dockery and
11 Caracciolo. Timmins and Patel constituted a special litigation committee (“SLC”) formed to
12 investigate and, if it determined necessary, prosecute the claims raised by the derivative
13 complaint. Timmins and Patel had been deemed independent with respect to those claims
14 because they were appointed to the Board after the awards were approved. The litigation
15 culminated in a settlement pursuant to which Naydenov, Klump, and Welch forfeited their
16 December 2019 awards in their entirety; Kelly forfeited 60% of his December 2019 award; and
17 Pourhassan forfeited the warrant to acquire 2 million shares as well as the vested options to
18 purchase 373,000 shares.⁹ The Board was also required to institute certain governance reforms
19 regarding compensation policies.

20 257. During an hearing regarding the settlement, Vice Chancellor Paul A. Fioravanti
21 Jr. commented that he was concerned that Pourhassan was allowed to keep even a portion of the
22 awards when there was “not even a pretense of evaluating the fairness of these grants”:

23 I am deeply troubled by the behavior of the defendants in approving these awards.
24 Based upon the record, this strikes me as a case of unmitigated greed. Not only
25 was there no process and not even a pretense of evaluating the fairness of these
grants, but the leaders of this compensation decision rejected legal advice and
withheld legal advice from some of the directors. . . . I am also concerned that the

26 ⁹ The January 2020 awards were forfeited because the vesting conditions were not met by the
27 stated deadline in July 2020.

1 SLC allowed the mastermind of these awards, Mr. Pourhassan, to keep the
2 equivalent of 40% of his awards . . . [and] the settlement does not expressly
3 prohibit any attempt to grant replacement awards or other compensation to
4 replace what has been forfeited in the settlement.

5 Despite the Delaware Chancery Court's express concern, on October 20, 2021, CytoDyn
6 awarded Pourhassan and Kelly 4,275,000 stock options and 1,750,000 stock options,
7 respectively.

8 258. The stipulation of settlement was entered on January 27, 2021, and final approval
9 and judgment was entered by June 2021. Timmins and Patel, who had coordinated the settlement
10 forfeiting Pourhassan's, Kelly's, and Naydenov's awards, did not stand for reelection at the
11 annual meeting in November 2021, purportedly "for personal reasons." They were replaced by
12 Lishomwa C. Ndhlovu and Tanya Durkee Urbach, who were "recommended by [CytoDyn's]
13 Chairman of the Board and Chief Medical Officer," i.e. Kelly. Kelly is not independent from
14 Pourhassan. As former directors allege, Kelly supported Pourhassan when he claimed "that
15 investors would not 'respect' him unless the Company paid him more" and he "felt that
16 Pourhassan should be kept happy due to the risk his sudden departure may have on [CytoDyn's]
17 operations."

18 259. The foregoing demonstrates that any director who acts against Pourhassan's
19 interests will be removed or forced out of the Company. As a result, the entire Board could not
20 disinterestedly consider a demand.

21 ***Additional Reasons That Demand is Excused***

22 260. Pourhassan is the Company's CEO, and therefore is not independent. As an
23 employee, Pourhassan derives substantially all of his income from his employment with
24 CytoDyn, thus he could not disinterestedly consider a demand for action that might require him
25 to sue the directors that control his continued employment and/or fellow members of
26 management with whom he works on a day-to-day basis. Moreover, as CEO and as alleged
27 herein, Pourhassan personally issued the materially misleading statements alleged herein and is
28

1 named as a defendant in the Securities Class Action. As a result, Pourhassan would be interested
2 in a demand regarding his own wrongdoing and demand is futile as to him.

3 261. Kelly is the Company's Chief Science Officer, Chief Medical Officer, and Head
4 of Business Development, and therefore is not independent. As an employee, Kelly derives
5 substantially all of his income from his employment with CytoDyn, thus he could not
6 disinterestedly consider a demand for action that might require him to sue the directors that
7 control his continued employment and/or fellow members of management with whom he works
8 on a day-to-day basis. Moreover, during fiscal 2020, the Board determined that Kelly was not
9 independent under NASDAQ listing rules. As a result, Kelly would be interested in a demand
10 regarding his own wrongdoing and demand is futile as to him.

11 262. Naydenov and Timmins served as the members of the Audit Committee at
12 relevant times. As such, they are responsible for the effectiveness of the Company's internal
13 controls, the integrity of its financial statements, and its compliance with laws and regulations.
14 In their capacities as Audit Committee members, Naydenov and Timmins reviewed and
15 approved the disclosures regarding Ieronlimab, the Company's sole drug candidate. As alleged
16 herein, Naydenov and Timmins failed to ensure the integrity of the Company's internal controls,
17 allowing the materially misleading statements to be disseminated in CytoDyn's SEC filings and
18 other disclosures. Thus, Naydenov and Timmins breached their fiduciary duties and are not
19 disinterested, and demand is excused as to them.

20 **COUNT I**

21 **(Against The Director Defendants For Breach Of Fiduciary Duty)**

22 263. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference and reallege each and every allegation
23 contained above, as though fully set forth herein.

24 264. The Director Defendants owe the Company fiduciary obligations. By reason of
25 their fiduciary relationships, the Director Defendants owed and owe the Company the highest
26 obligation of good faith, fair dealing, loyalty, and due care.

265. The Director Defendants violated and breached their fiduciary duties of care, loyalty, reasonable inquiry, and good faith.

266. The Director Defendants engaged in a sustained and systematic failure to properly exercise their fiduciary duties. Among other things, the Director Defendants breached their fiduciary duties of loyalty and good faith by allowing the Company to make false and misleading statements and failing to maintain an adequate system of oversight, disclosure controls and procedures, and internal controls as alleged herein. These actions could not have been a good faith exercise of prudent business judgment to protect and promote the Company's corporate interests.

267. As a direct and proximate result of the Director Defendants' failure to perform their fiduciary obligations, the Company has sustained significant damages. As a result of the misconduct alleged herein, the Director Defendants are liable to the Company.

268. As a direct and proximate result of the Director Defendants' breach of their fiduciary duties, the Company has suffered damage, not only monetarily, but also to its corporate image and goodwill.

COUNT II

(Against The Director Defendants For Waste Of Corporate Assets)

269. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference and reallege each and every allegation contained above, as though fully set forth herein.

270. The wrongful conduct alleged regarding the issuance of false and misleading statements and its failure to maintain an adequate system of oversight, disclosure controls and procedures, and internal controls was continuous, connected, and on-going throughout the Relevant Period. It resulted in continuous, connected, and ongoing harm to the Company.

271. As a result of the misconduct described above, the Director Defendants wasted corporate assets by, inter alia: (i) paying excessive compensation and bonuses to certain of its executive officers; (ii) awarding self-interested stock options to certain officers and directors;

1 and (iii) incurring potentially millions of dollars of legal liability and/or legal costs to defend
2 Defendants' unlawful actions.

3 272. As a result of the waste of corporate assets, the Director Defendants are liable to
4 the Company.

5 273. Plaintiffs, on behalf of the Company, have no adequate remedy at law.

6 **COUNT III**

7 **(Against Defendants Pourhassan and Mulholland For Unjust Enrichment)**

8 274. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference and re-allege each and every allegation set
9 forth above, as though fully set forth herein.

10 275. By their wrongful acts and the omissions of material fact that they caused to be
11 made, Defendants were unjustly enriched at the expense of, and to the detriment of, the
12 Company.

13 276. Plaintiffs, as shareholders and representatives of the Company, seek restitution
14 from Defendants Pourhassan and Mulholland and seek an order from this Court disgorging all
15 profits, benefits, and other compensation, including any performance-based or valuation based
16 compensation, obtained by Defendants Pourhassan and Mulholland due to their wrongful
17 conduct and breach of their fiduciary duties.

18 277. Further, Defendants Pourhassan and Mulholland dumped millions of shares. For
19 example, on April 30, 2020, after exercising options to purchase millions of CytoDyn shares at
20 prices less than \$1.00 per share, Defendant Pourhassan sold over 4.8 million shares of CytoDyn
21 stock, for over \$15.7 million in total proceeds. Defendant Pourhassan's sale was approximately
22 85% of his total holdings of CytoDyn stock. In addition, on December 21, 2020, Defendant
23 Mulholland sold over 1.1 million shares for over \$5.8 million in total proceeds. Thereafter, on
24 December 28, 2020, Defendant Mulholland sold over 711,000 shares for over \$4.4 million in
25 total proceeds.

278. By their wrongful acts, violations of law, and false and misleading statements and omissions of material fact that they made and/or caused to be made, Defendants Pourhassan and Mulholland were unjustly enriched at the expense of, and to the detriment of, the Company.

279. Plaintiffs, on behalf of the Company, have no adequate remedy at law.

COUNT IV

(Against Defendants Pourhassan and Mulholland for Contribution for Violations of Sections 10(b) and 21D Of The Exchange Act)

280. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference and reallege each and every allegation contained above, as though fully set forth herein.

281. The Company, along with Defendants Pourhassan and Mulholland are named as defendants in the Securities Class Actions, which assert claims under the federal securities laws for violations of Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Exchange Act, and SEC Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder. If and when the Company is found liable in the Securities Class Actions for these violations of law, the Company's liability will be in whole or in part due to Defendants Pourhassan and Mulholland's willful and/or reckless violations of their obligations as officers and directors of the Company.

282. Through their positions of control and authority as officers of the Company, Defendants Pourhassan and Mulholland were able to and did, directly and/or indirectly, exercise control over the business and corporate affairs of the Company, including the wrongful acts described in the Securities Class Actions and herein.

283. As such, Defendants Pourhassan and Mulholland are liable under 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), which creates a private right of action for contribution, and Section 21D of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(f), which governs the application of a private right of action for contribution arising out of violations of the Exchange Act.

284. Defendants Pourhassan and Mulholland have damaged the Company and are liable to the Company for contribution.

285. No adequate remedy at law exists for Plaintiffs by and on behalf of the Company.

COUNT IV

(Against Defendants Pourhassan, Mulholland and Kelly: Insider Trading)

286. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference and reallege each and every allegation contained above, as though fully set forth herein.

287. During the Relevant Period, Defendants Pourhassan, Mulholland and Kelly owed the Company duties of loyalty, good faith, and care as officers and directors of the Company.

288. By virtue of their positions as officers and directors of the Company and their exercise of control over the Company, at all times relevant to the wrongdoing complained of herein Defendants Pourhassan, Mulholland and Kelly had the power to, and did, control and influence the business and management of the Company's affairs, including its role in the facts and circumstances surrounding the wrongdoing complained of herein.

289. Defendants Pourhassan, Mulholland and Kelly breached their fiduciary duties in connection with their sales of Company stock by doing so on the basis of material, adverse, nonpublic information, to the detriment of the Company and its public stockholders.

290. Plaintiffs, on behalf of the Company have no adequate remedy at law.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for relief and judgment, as follows:

- A. Declaring that Plaintiffs may maintain this action on behalf of the Company and that Plaintiffs are adequate representatives of the Company;
- B. Finding the Director Defendants liable for breaching their fiduciary duties owed to the Company;
- C. Directing Defendants to take all necessary actions to reform and improve the Company's corporate governance, risk management, and internal operating procedures to comply with applicable laws and to protect the Company and its stockholders from a repeat of the rampant wrongful conduct described herein;
- D. Awarding Plaintiffs the costs and disbursements of this action, including attorneys', accountants', and experts' fees; and

E. Awarding such other and further relief as is just and equitable.

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

Plaintiffs hereby demand a trial by jury of all issues so triable.

Dated: January 20, 2022

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 20th day of January, 2022, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system which will send notification of such filing to all counsel of record.

s/ Yonten Dorjee
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